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ABSTRACT

TOWARD SAFE AND VERIFIABLE INTER-DOMAIN
ROUTING
FEBRUARY 2022
XIAOZHE SHAO
B.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF CHINA
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF CHINA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Lixin Gao

Interdomain routing enables each autonomous system (AS) to decide the routes
toward any destination and exchange routing information with its neighboring ASs on
the Internet. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as the de facto routing protocol
for interdomain routing, allows the administrators/operators to independently decide
the routing policies for their ASs and each AS to select routes to destinations based
on the locally determined routing policies.
The Internet has evolved from a hierarchical and multi-tiered interconnection network to a meshed network, where ASs are interconnected with a dense topology and
more and more potential paths can be used to reach a destination. Although each AS
has the freedom to set up its routing policies, it is challenging to understand how a
network’s routing policies might impact the resulting routing system. On one hand,

vi

the freedom in configuring local routing policies might jeopardize the safeness of the
routing system. That is, configuring routing policies without constraints or coordination among ASs causes persistent interdomain routing oscillations on the Internet. On
the other hand, these independently configured routing policies might not necessarily
meet the intent of the network administrators/operators. Therefore, it is essential to
ensure that the routing system is guaranteed to converge and to know whether the
routing system satisfies the routing intent of network administrators/operators.
This research aims to improve the understanding of the routing systems that are
derived from the locally determined routing policies. To do that, three interesting
topics are explored in this dissertation: (1) policy-rich interdomain routing through
local coordination, (2) verifying inter-domain routing at Internet scale, (3) routing
policy anonymization for verification.
The increasingly interconnected Internet topologies can potentially lead to richer
routing policies. We systematically enable more and more flexible routing policies
to implement various routing intents and derive sufficient conditions for the safeness of the routing system derived by those policies. The conditions can be verified
through coordination among neighboring ASs. Thus, local coordination is sufficient
to guarantee the convergence of the routing system.
To verify the interdomain routing system, we propose a scheme that characterizes
routing policy verification problems into Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) problems. The key idea is to formulate the SMT model in a policy-aware manner so as
to reduce/eliminate the mutual dependencies between variables as much as possible.
Further, we reduce the size of the generated SMT model through pruning, so that
the interdomain routing system can be verified within a reasonable time.
Routing policies are necessary to perform interdomain routing verification. However, network operators would not publish their routing policies without a proper
privacy guarantee, since routing policies of a network are proprietary information.

vii

We anonymize Internet-scale topology with routing policy as well as preserve the
utility for routing verification.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Internet connects thousands of Autonomous Systems (ASs) operated by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), companies, and universities. ASs interconnect via
dedicated links and public network access points, and exchange reachability information using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP is a policy-based protocol
that allows ASs to apply local policies for selecting routes and propagating routing
information, without revealing their routing policies to others.
Routing policies determine what routes are allowed in the Internet and how routes
are chosen for a destination. An end-to-end path across multiple ASs is typically
determined collectively by the policies of these ASs. Each network sets its own routing
policies with little or no coordination with other networks. It is therefore challenging
to understand how a network’s routing policies might impact routes of other networks.
First of all, the freedom in configuring local routing policies might jeopardize the
safeness of the routing system. That is, configuring routing policies without constraints or coordination among ASs causes persistent interdomain routing oscillations
on the Internet. Moreover, these independently configured routing policies might not
necessarily meet the intent of the network administrators/operators. Therefore, it is
essential to ensure that the routing system is guaranteed to converge and to know
whether the routing system satisfies the routing intent of network administrators/operators.
This research aims to improve the understanding of the routing systems that are
derived from the locally determined routing policies. To do that, three interesting
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topics are explored in this dissertation: (1) policy-rich interdomain routing through
local coordination, (2) verifying inter-domain routing at Internet scale, (3) routing
policy anonymization for verification.

1.1

Policy-rich Interdomain Routing

Traditionally, the interconnections in the Internet have a hierarchical structure,
where tier-1 ISPs provide settlement-free services among each other, and provide
transit services to regional ISPs or stub networks, and regional ISPs provide transit
services to even smaller ISPs or stub networks. As the Internet has evolved, it becomes a meshed network [59, 18, 6, 33, 55], where large content providers and content
distribution networks (e.g. Google, Facebook and Akamai) interconnect with hundreds or thousands of networks around the world [103, 77, 99], and regional ISPs or
stub networks interconnect with each other through dedicated links or IXP [8, 55, 58].
These increasingly interconnected Internet topologies can lead to potential richer
routing policies. The well-known Gao-Rexford guidelines for routing policies assume
that each AS determines its routing policy without being aware of neighboring ASs’
policies. As a result, routing policies might be unnecessarily restrictive and limit the
selection of paths to among the traditional paths in the hierarchical network.
In fact, a survey [35] on routing policies deployed by network operators has shown
that a significant portion of ASs do not follow the Gao-Rexford guidelines completely.
For example, the survey shows that networks do not always prefer customers over
peers and networks might export peer or provider routes to peers.
In this chapter, we propose to broaden routing policies that enable diverse paths
and provide flexibility in selecting these paths. We systematically bring out more
and more flexible routing policies and derive the sufficient conditions for guaranteeing
safeness of the routing system. Further, we show that these conditions can be verified
through local coordination among neighboring ASs.
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1.2

Verifying Policy-based Routing at Internet Scale

Policy-based routing protocols, such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), allow
network administrators/operators to configure flexible routing policies independently.
Each network sets its own routing policies with little or no coordination with other
networks. It is therefore challenging to understand how a network’s routing policies
might impact routes of other networks. The route taken by a packet to traverse in
the Internet is determined by the distributed route selection process, and a result of
complex interactions controlled by the configured policies.
The paths/routes resulted from these independently configured routing policies
might not necessarily meet the intent of the network administrators/operators. For
example, a pair of networks might not be able to reach each other due to routing policy
misconfiguration. Indeed, the policy misconfiguration of a single network might lead
to a widespread outage in the Internet [9]. Further, a network might have a few
desirable goals when setting its routing policy. For example, it might want to ensure
that its traffic from a specific content provider such as Google not to use a specific
provider.
Formal methods can provide a sound and thorough verification to questions whether
the intent of a network is satisfied through exhaustive search. Researchers propose
a number of formal methods to study and analyze the BGP routing system. To
study the safety property of BGP systems, Satisfiable Module Theories (SMT) [93]
and Rewriting Logic [92, 94, 95] are used to verify the convergence conditions of the
system. Recently, [11, 98] propose to verify network configurations through modeling
routing behavior with SMT constraints.
These proposed models for BGP routing verification can typically handle up to
hundreds of routers at most. It would be challenging to verify routing properties at
Internet scale where there are tens of thousands networks and each network consists
of tens to thousands of routers. Even if we verify network routing properties in a
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confined scope (e.g., within a set of networks owned by a single company), it might
require to scale to tens of thousands of routers.
In this chapter, we propose policy-aware models that translate the network verification problem into SMT constraints, and perform the network verification through
solving the SMT problem. In order to scale the verification system, our policy-aware
model reduces the mutual dependencies between variables considering routing policy constraints in the Internet. In other words, we explicitly account for routing
policy constraints in constructing the SMT constraints. In particular, we construct
a series of policy-aware models. First, we consider routing policies that follow the
Gao-Rexford guideline [31]. We then generalize the model to capture routing policies
beyond the Gao-Rexford guideline. Furthermore, we propose an approach to prune
the generated SMT model.
We implement the verification toolkit based on a SMT solver, Z3 [17], and evaluate
the policy-aware model through verifications on network topologies of various sizes.
The experimental results show that the policy-aware model can reduce the time it
takes to perform verifications by as much as 100x even under a modest topology with
a thousand nodes. Further, we show that it is feasible to deploy the model at Internet
scale. It takes only a few minutes to answer a query for a topology containing tens
of thousands of nodes.

1.3

Path-preserving Anonymization for Inter-domain Routing Policies

Routing verification helps network operators design, operate, and troubleshoot
the network configuration. Both the Internet topology and routing policies of networks are necessary to perform Internet-wide verification. Given the topology and
the routing policies, Internet-wide verification can answer the questions whether the
routes satisfies the intent of a network through exhaustive search. For example, for-
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mal methods, such as Satisfiable Module Theories (SMT), are used to verify the
routing convergence conditions of the Internet [93]. Internet-wide verification can
also discover the potential traffic attraction attacks [85, 79].
In order to protect the policy privacy of the networks, we perturb the Internet topology and routing policies before publishing it for verification. After graph
anonymization, the routing policies should not be revealed.
In contrast to the general graph anonymization problems, such as anonymizing
social networks and collaboration networks, the utility of the graph for routing verification should not be jeopardized by the anonymization. More specifically, the routing
verification result on the anonymized graph should be same with that on the original
graph. Otherwise, the verification result on the anonymized graph does not reflect
the routing of the Internet.
Existing graph anonymization schemes protect the privacy of graph through the
graph structure perturbation [105, 69], such as removing certain networks or adding
edges between two disconnected networks. However, those operations on the original
graph do not preserve the utility of the graph. For example, when a certain node is
removed from the original graph, the routing verification related to the node leads
to a different result. Adding an edge between two disconnected networks might also
impact the verification result, since the added edge might be selected as a part of the
route between two networks.
In this chapter, we anonymize Interet-scale topology with routing policies for
routing verification. The anonymization scheme perturbs both the graph structure
and the associated routing policies so that a network can not be identified in the
anonymized graph and therefore the routing policies associated to the networks can
not be revealed. We carefully select the way to perturb the graph so that the verification result can be maintained on the anonymized graph.
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The most obvious attack to anonymization is to use the node degree information.
The networks with unique degrees can be easily identified. We first consider to defend
degree-based de-anonymization attacks. Simply adding fake edges between networks
in the Internet topology is not sufficient, since these fake edges can be easily identified
by the routing policy correlated to them. We propose to add fake networks into the
Internet topology. Therefore, we propose to connect fake networks and real networks
to perturb the graph structure.
To perturb graph structure, we propose a deterministic anonymization scheme
which derives a k-anonymity graph. As a result, the probability of identifying a
network by the degree information is at most k1 . However, the k-anonymity graph
generated by the deterministic anonymization scheme is deterministic. We further
propose the probabilistic anonymization scheme to generate probabilistic k-anonymity
graph. To anonymize Internet topologies, the probabilistic anonymization scheme
enlarges the graph with numerous fake networks when the degree difference is large.
It might make the scheme infeasible in practice.
Finally, we propose the hybrid anonymization scheme to take advantage of the
strengths of both the deterministic anonymization scheme and the probabilistic anonymization scheme. We will first use the deterministic anonymization scheme to reduce the
degree difference in the graph. After that we derive probabilistic k-anonymity graph
by using the probabilistic anonymization scheme.
After fake networks and edges are added into the anonymized graph, wwe propose
to generate the associated routing policies for those fake networks and edges. There
are two goals to generate the routing policy. First, the utility for routing verification
should be preserved after anonymization. Second, the generated routing policy are
similar with the original routing policy to defend the potential de-anonymization
attacks based on the routing policy.
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We also evaluate the proposed anonymization schemes against de-anonymization
attacks exploiting rich structural information, such as neighborhood and reference
distance. The experimental result shows that the structure based de-anonymization
attacks can only identify less than 1% networks from the anonymized graph.

1.4

Contributions

The major contributions of this dissertation are to understand the routing behavior of BGP based on the routing policies of network in the Internet. The dissertation
focuses on three aspects: safeness of routing system, interdomain routing verification [79] and routing policy anonymization. More specifically, our main contributions
are as follows.
• We propose to broaden routing policies that enable diverse paths and provide
flexibility in selecting these paths. We systematically bring out more and more
flexible routing policies and derive the sufficient conditions for guaranteeing
safeness of the routing system. Further, we show that these conditions can be
verified through local coordination among neighboring ASs.
• We propose policy-aware models that translate the network verification problem into SMT constraints, and perform the network verification through solving
the SMT problem. In order to scale the verification system, our policy-aware
model reduces the mutual dependencies between variables considering routing
policy constraints in the Internet. In other words, we explicitly account for
routing policy constraints in constructing the SMT constraints. In particular,
we construct a series of policy-aware models. First, we consider routing policies
that follow Gao-Rexford guideline. We then generalize the model to capture
routing policies beyond the Gao-Rexford guideline. Furthermore, we propose
an approach to prune the generated SMT model. We implement the verification toolkit based on a SMT solver, Z3, and evaluate the policy-aware model
7

through verifications on network topologies of various sizes. The experimental
results show that the policy-aware model can reduce the time it takes to perform
verifications by as much as 100x even under a modest topology with a thousand
nodes. Further, we show that it is feasible to deploy the model at Internet scale.
It takes only a few minutes to answer a query for a topology containing tens of
thousands of nodes.
• We anonymize Internet-scale topology with routing policies for routing verification. The anonymization scheme perturbs both the graph structure and
the associated routing policies so that a network can not be identified in the
anonymized graph and therefore the routing policies associated to the networks
can not be revealed. We carefully select the way to perturb the graph so that
the verification result can be maintained on the anonymized graph.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we propose
policy-rich routing with local coordination. Chapter 3 presents our policy-aware models to verify networks at Internet scale. In Chapter 4, we illustrate our approaches of
anonymizing Internet-scale topology with routing policies. We conclude this dissertation in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2
POLICY-RICH INTERDOMAIN ROUTING WITH
LOCAL COORDINATION

2.1

Introduction

The Internet consists of tens of thousands of autonomous systems (ASes), each
of which belongs to an organization such as an Internet Service Provider (ISP), a
university, a company, or an Internet Exchange Point (IXP). Traditionally, the interconnections in the Internet have a hierarchical structure, where tier-1 ISPs provide settlement-free services among each other, and provide transit services to regional ISPs or stub networks, and regional ISPs provide transit services to even
smaller ISPs or stub networks. As the Internet has evolved, it became a meshed
network [59, 18, 6, 33, 55], where large content providers and content distribution
networks (e.g. Google, Facebook and Akamai) interconnect with hundreds or thousands of networks around the world [103, 77, 99], and regional ISPs or stub networks
interconnect with each other through dedicated links or IXP [8, 55, 58].
These increasingly interconnected Internet topologies can lead to potential richer
routing policies. To illustrate potential routing policies, we use the AS-level topology
around University of Vermont (UVM) network and Middlebury College (MC) network as an example.1 UVM and MC achieve global reachability through commercial
ISPs, UVM through Cogent and MC through LEVEL3 respectively. As a member
of Internet2, UVM also connects to Internet2 which is well-provisioned and provides
1

For simplicity, Figure 2.1 shows only a few neighboring networks of UVM and MC. The interconnections in Figure 2.1 are derived from CAIDA AS relationships [13]. Similarly, Figure 2.2 and
Figure 2.3 show the interconnections derived from CAIDA AS relationships.
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Figure 2.1: AS-level topology around the networks of UVM and MC.

high performance connectivity for the participant networks. In addition to providercustomer relationships, regional ISPs and/or stub networks peer with each other to
exchange the traffic directly. For example, MC and Education Networks of America
(ENA) peer with UVM respectively. Now, we illustrate a potential scenario where the
export policy of the peer to peer relationship can be extended to enable more routes.
MC can reach the rest of the Internet through its commercial ISP, LEVEL3. Alternatively, MC might want to reach Internet2 through its peer, UVM. If UVM wants
to satisfy the routing requirements of MC, UVM should set up its routing policy to
announce routes from Internet2 to MC. That is, UVM exports its provider route to its
peer. As a result, UVM and MC do not have a conventional peer to peer relationship.
Further, MC is not a customer of UVM, since UVM only announces to MC the routes
from a specific provider, Internet2, instead of all routes. Not only stub networks but
also commercial ISPs and content providers, especially medium-size networks [75],
might want to export a provider route to a selected peer.
In addition to announcing more paths to neighbors and allowing more potential
paths, routing policies play a critical role on enabling the flexibility of selecting the
best path. We use Figure 2.2 to illustrate how a network can take advantage of
the flexibility of ranking routes. Figure 2.2 illustrates the interconnections among
the University of Massachusetts (UMASS) network and Five Colleges (FC) network.
UMASSP DOM provides Internet connections for several UMASS campuses, such as
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Figure 2.2: AS-level topology around the networks of UMass and Five Colleges.

Amherst, Lowell and Dartmouth while FC connects five colleges located in the Connecticut River Pioneer Valley which includes one of UMASS campuses at Amherst.
To reach UMASS Amherst, UMASSP DOM can use the directly connected link or the
path through FC. UMASSP DOM usually selects the customer link to reach UMASS
Amherst. Alternatively, UMASSP DOM might prefer the path through FC, in the
case that the link between UMASSP DOM and UMASS Amherst is congested. In
order to do so, UMASSP DOM needs to prefer the peer link over the customer link
to reach the destinations in UMASS Amherst. It is not uncommon that commercial
ISPs need the flexibility of selecting paths as well [6, 67].
Although network operators can set up any routing policy for peers to implement
their routing requirements, without coordination, the resulting routing policy might
lead to routing oscillation. As we illustrate in the AS-level topology of Figure 2.2,
Five Colleges might prefer peer routes over customer routes. However, if UMASSP
DOM also prefers peer routes over customer routes, then the routing system is not
safe.
Note that none of the above routing policy examples follows the Gao-Rexford
guidelines [31], which provide rules for routing policies to derive a safe routing system. Then, it is not clear what kind of routing policies are guaranteed to be safe.
Researchers propose a number of extensions to Gao-Rexford guidelines, in terms of
broadening the export routing policies [31, 30] or accommodating sibling relationships [60, 84]. These rules for routing policies do not enable sufficient flexibility at
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import routing policies. As for the routing scenario illustrated in Figure 2.1, UVM
can announce routes from Internet2 to MC by following routing policy rules proposed
in [31, 30]. However, these routes have to be backup routes. Only if there are no
primary routes, these backup routes can be selected as the best routes [30].
In this chapter, without compromising the routing stability, we propose to broaden
routing policies that enable diverse paths and provide flexibility in selecting these
paths. We systematically bring out more and more flexible routing policies and derive the sufficient conditions for guaranteeing the routing systems to be safe. Further,
we show that these conditions can be verified through local coordination among neighboring ASes. Specifically, we propose the following three routing policies.
• We propose FlexibleRC routing policy that allows ASes to selectively prefer a
peer route over one or more customer routes (Section 2.4).
• We propose PeerBoost routing policy to expand the paths beyond what are
allowed by the Gao-Rexford guidelines. In particular, an AS can selectively announce its peer routes to another peer and/or provider and selectively announce
its provider routes to its peer. In addition, the ranking among these paths is
flexible in the sense that the newly allowed paths can be ranked higher than
those allowed by the Gao-Rexford guidelines (Section 2.5).
• We further propose hierarchical sibling routing policies to accommodate the
sibling contractual agreement (Section 2.6).
We evaluate the flexibility of the proposed routing policies in Section 2.7. We
discuss related work in Section 2.8 and conclude in Section 2.9.
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2.2

Motivation

In this section, we first review the Gao-Rexford guidelines. We then show the
motivation of allowing more potential paths through export policies and more flexible
ranking among paths through import policies.

2.2.1

Routing Policies under the Gao-Rexford Guidelines

Provider-customer agreement and peer to peer agreement are two common agreements in the Internet [50]. Within a provider-customer agreement, an AS as the
customer pays its provider to access the rest of the Internet. Within a peer to peer
agreement, two connected ASes exchange traffic from their own customers.
The Gao-Rexford guidelines have the following export policy:
• An AS can export its peer routes and provider routes to its customers.
• An AS can export its customer routes to its customers, peers and providers.
A customer route is a route in which the first link is a provider-customer link, a
provider route is a route in which the first link is a customer-provider link, and a peer
route is a route in which the first link is a peer link.
The Gao-Rexford guidelines have the following import policy:
• ASes prefer customer routes over peer routes and provider routes.
Routing policies that follow the Gao-Rexford guidelines are safe, when there are
no provider-customer cycles. A routing policy is safe if any routing system with the
routing policy always converges to a stable state under any link or node failure [31].

2.2.2

Motivation to Expand Routing Policies

A number of ASes do not follow the Gao-Rexford guideline to set up their routing
policies, according to a survey among network operators [35] and network measurement studies on the inter-domain routing [6, 67, 75].
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A survey on routing policies deployed by network operators shows that 32% networks including transit networks, content providers and stub networks do not follow
the Gao-Rexford guidelines completely [35]. More specifically, in 16 out of 97 networks, routes from a peer or transit provider are preferred over customer routes while
within 21 out of 97 networks including small/medium/large transit providers routes
from peers and providers are announced to peers and providers.
The measurement for the inter-domain routing also implies that the Gao-Rexford
guidelines are violated by networks on the Internet [6, 67, 75]. For example, 34.3% of
routing decisions in the Internet routing system can not be explained by Gao-Rexford
model [6] and Qiu et al. find that 11% provider ASes propagate valley announcements
by analyzing real-world BGP updates [75].

2.2.3

Export Policies that Enable Potential Paths

In the following, we will discuss how to broaden the export policies for peer and
accommodate sibling relationships.

2.2.3.1

Selective Export

Peer to peer relationships are established to exchange traffic between customers of
two neighboring networks. Following the Gao-Rexford guidelines, an AS only exports
customer routes to its peers. In reality, an AS has the need to export its provider
routes to its peers and export its peer routes to its peers or providers [35]. We propose
to extend the export policy for peer to peer relationships as follows.
2.2.3.1.1

Export a provider route to a selected peer For the example in

Figure 2.1, MC would like to reach Internet2 through UVM. To do so, UVM has to
export its provider route from Internet2 to its peer, MC. To allow ASes to reach its
peer’s provider, we consider the export policy, where an AS can export a provider
route to a selected peer.
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Figure 2.3: The topology around ASes of Amazon.

2.2.3.1.2

Export a peer route to a selected provider To fetch content back

from Internet2, UVM allows traffic from Internet2 to reach MC. That is, an AS might
export its peer routes to its providers. To accommodate the routing requirement that
an AS reaches its customer’s peer, we consider the export policy, where an AS can
export a peer route to a selected provider.
2.2.3.1.3

Export a peer route to a selected peer Further, an AS might

export one of its peer routes to another peer. In the example of Figure 2.1, UVM
peers with Education Networks of America (ENA) and MC respectively. MC might
want to access the customers of ENA through UVM instead of its commercial ISPs.
In that case, UVM needs to announce its peer routes from ENA to MC. That is, an
AS might export its peer routes to a selected peer.

2.2.3.2

Sibling

A pair of neighboring ASes might want to export all its routes to each other. That
is the pair of ASes have a sibling relationship, which are typically established between
ASes that are managed by the same organization or two closely related organizations.
For example, in Figure 2.3, we illustrate the topology around five ASes that all belong
to the same organization, Amazon. The five Amazon ASes can establish the sibling
relationship with their neighbors within the sibling cluster. Within the sibling cluster,
ASes export all routes to their siblings. For example, all five Amazon ASes can access
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Telia through the link between Amazon-AP and Telia while all five Amazon ASes can
access destinations of Expereo through Amazon1. Formally, when a pair of connected
ASes, A and B, establish sibling relationship, A will announce all its routes to B and
B will announce all its routes to A.

2.2.4

Import Policies that Enable Flexible Ranking

Given much more available routes, it is also essential to broaden import polices,
so that ASes can flexibly select the best one.

2.2.4.1

Selectively prefer peer routes over customer routes

An AS might want to balance its traffic between its customer and peer, and
therefore prefers a peer over a customer for a destination that be reached through
both.

2.2.4.2

Prefer additional routes from customers over provider routes

When the potential paths are enabled as Section 2.2.3 shows, these additional
routes from customers should be preferred over provider routes. For example, in
Figure 2.1, UVM can announce the route from MC to Internet2, so that Internet2
can exploit UVM to reach MC. Meanwhile, Internet2 should prefer the additional
routes from UVM over its provider routes. Therefore, Internet2 can select the newlyenabled route as the best route.

Table 2.1: Peer link statistics of the Internet.
Y ears
1998
2003
2008
2013
2018

ASes
Links
3, 638 6, 728
15, 320 34, 720
28, 411 78, 997
44, 326 149, 476
60, 874 300, 634

Peer Links
933
6, 635
24, 519
63, 344
178, 608
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% of Peer Links
13.87%
19.11%
31.04%
42.38%
59.41%
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Export and Import Rules
P2R
R2P
R2R
Prefer Peers over Customers
Prefer Routes enabled by
P2R, R2P and R2R

Not Enabled

Not Enabled

Not Enabled

FlexibleRC
Not Enabled
Not Enabled
Not Enabled
Enabled

Gao-Rexford [31] Safe Backup Routing [30, 60]
Not Enabled
Enabled
Not Enabled
Enabled
Not Enabled
Enabled
Not Enabled
Not Enabled

Table 2.2: Export and import rules enabled by routing policies.

Enabled

PeerBoost
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled

2.3

Overview of Policy-Rich Routing

We propose routing policies to enable more potential paths through peer links
without compromising the routing convergence. Such policy-rich routing is essential
given a meshed Internet, where there are more and more peer links. Table 2.1 illustrates the number and percentage of the peer links over the last 20 years. We can
see that the peer links have increased significantly in both number and percentage.
The AS relationships are derived from CAIDA dataset [13]. It has been shown that
not all peer links can be identified through measurement [72, 36, 37]. We expect that
there are even more peer links in reality.
In order to enable more potential routes and allow flexible ranking among routes,
we systematically propose a series of routing policies.
As the first step, we relax the constraint that customer routes are more preferred
than peer routes. We propose FlexibleRC routing policies that enable flexible ranking
between peer and customer routes. Specifically, FlexibleRC allows ASes to prefer peer
routes over customer routes.
We then enable more potential routes through selective export. First, we consider
selectively-export-provider-route-to-peer (P2R) export rule which allows an AS to selectively export provider routes to some of its peers. Second, we consider selectivelyexport-peer-route-to-provider (R2P) export rule which allows an AS to selectively
export peer routes to some of its providers. At last, we consider selectively-exportpeer-route-to-peer (R2R) export rule which allows an AS to selectively export peer

Table 2.3: Summary of proposed routing policies.
Routing Policy
FlexibleRC (Section 2.4)
PeerBoost (Section 2.5)
Sibling (Section 2.6)

Policy Description
Enable preferring peer over customer routes.
Enable (1) export rules (P2R, R2P and R2R)
(2) preferring routes enabled by the export rules.
Accommodate sibling relationship.
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routes to some of its peers. We propose PeerBoost routing policies to enable three
selective export rules and flexible ranking among peer and customer routes.
Table 2.2 illustrates the export and import rules of the routing systems enabled
by the Gao-Rexford guidelines [31], safe backup routing [30, 60] and the proposed
routing policies. Safe backup routing enables backup paths to increase the reliability
of the networks. FlexibleRC provides more flexible import routing policies than GaoRexford guidelines and safe backup routing [30, 60] through enabling ASes to prefer
peer routes over customer routes. Further, PeerBoost enhances FlexibleRC through
enabling P2R, R2P and R2R export rules and preferring these newly-enabled routes
over routes enabled by Gao-Rexford guidelines.
Finally, we accommodate sibling relationships in which a pair of ASes export all
routes to each other. Table 2.3 summarizes all proposed routing policies and the
respective sections describing these routing policies.
So far, we assume that routing policies are set independent of destination prefixes.
Nevertheless, it is possible to address the routing policies in the prefix level. In fact,
all of the results in this chapter will apply to routing policies that are set for a specific
prefix as well. One issue of per-prefix policies is that the network operators must pay
attention to any change of the prefixes with special policies, since the destination
network might add or remove the prefix that it owns. For simplicity of exposition,
we describe all routing policies independent of destination prefixes throughout this
chapter.

2.4

Selectively Prefer Peers over Customers

In this section, we explore the potential flexibility for ranking paths that are
permitted by the Gao-Rexford guidelines. More specifically, we propose FlexibleRC
routing policies which allow ASes to prefer peer routes over customer routes. We
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(a) Safe

(b) Unsafe

Figure 2.4: Routing systems with OC peers.

derive a sufficient condition for routing convergence and show that the sufficient
condition can be checked through local coordination.
2.4.1

FlexibleRC Routing Policy

In FlexibleRC routing policies, the export policy is same with the Gao-Rexford
guidelines. To enable flexible ranking among peer routes and customer routes, FlexibleRC has the following import policy:
• An AS prefers customer routes over provider routes.
The import policy of FlexibleRC does not regulate the ranking of peer routes. For
example, an AS might prefer a peer route over all customer routes. An AS could also
prefer a peer route over some customer routes. Or, an AS might prefer all customer
routes over a peer route. In FlexbileRC policies, customers of an AS always have a
higher ranking than providers of the AS. If an AS, A, has a peer, B, and A prefers a
peer route from B over a customer route, B is an over-customer peer (OC peer) of A.
2.4.2

Convergence Analysis

FlexibleRC routing policies are not guaranteed to be safe due to the flexible ranking of peer routes. In this section, we explore a sufficient condition for routing convergence.
To show how the OC peers impact on the convergence of a routing system, we
show two routing systems with OC peers in Figure 2.4. In these figures, we illustrate
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Figure 2.5: An unsafe routing system (BAD GADGET) with OC peers.

the topology, all ASes and all potential routes to a destination AS. In the routing
system of Figure 2.4 (a), to reach AS D, AS A prefers the route through B over its
customer route and AS B prefers its own customer route over the peer route from AS
A. Therefore, AS B is an OC peer of AS A. Clearly, the routing system is safe even
though there is an OC peer. However, you might not be able to set up OC peers
everywhere in the routing system. For example, in the routing system of Figure 2.4
(b), to reach AS D, both AS A and AS B prefer the route through each other over
their customer routes respectively. Therefore, AS A and AS B treat each other as an
OC peer and the OC peer relationship forms a cycle. The routing system is clearly not
safe since it is the system DISAGREE in [46]. Figure 2.5 illustrates another example
routing system which is BAD GADGET [46] and is not safe. In this example, the
cycle, A-B-C-A, comprises a provider-customer link and two OC peer links. More
generally, when provider-customer links and OC peer links form a cycle, the routing
system might not be safe.
We define an over-customer (OC) cycle as an AS cycle, vn ...v0 , where v0 = vn and
∀i ∈ [0, n − 1], vi is a customer or an OC peer of vi+1 .
Theorem 2.4.1. A FlexibleRC routing policy is guaranteed to be safe, if there are no
OC cycles.
We provide the proof in A.1.
The absence of OC cycles is a sufficient but not necessary condition for routing
convergence. Even if a routing system is safe, there might be an OC cycle. For
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Figure 2.6: An example routing system which is safe but contains OC cycles.

example, in Figure 2.6, we illustrate the whole AS-level topology and all potential
routes of a routing system which contains an OC cycle, A-B-C-A. However, the routing
system is guaranteed to be safe.
Routing guidelines, such as the Gao-Rexford guidelines [31] and backup routing [30], guarantee the convergence of the routing system without requiring any coordination among neighboring ASes. When the safe condition in Theorem 2.4.1 is
satisfied, FlexibleRC policy enables more flexible routing policies. That is, to establish OC peers without jeopardizing the convergence property of the routing system,
we need to ensure that there is no OC cycle.
To guarantee the routing system safe, there are several existing conditions for
convergence, such as no Dispute Wheels [43] and the freeness property of the routing
system [83, 45]. However, to check those conditions, the exact routing polices for
all ASes are essential. This is challenging in practice, since ASes are not willing to
share their routing policies. FlexibleRC policies enable ASes to prefer peer routes
over customer routes while the safe condition needs to be verified without sharing
routing policies.
When the network operators of an AS want to change the routing policy, to
guarantee the FlexibleRC policy to be safe, the network operators of the AS need to
check whether the policy change leads to an OC cycle. OC cycle includes providercustomer links and OC peer links only. Therefore, only when an AS wants to set
up a customer or an OC peer, the network operators of the AS need to initiate
a coordination process to check whether there will be an OC cycle. During the
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coordination process, the network operators of an AS ask the network operators of its
customers and OC peers whether, through provider-customer links and OC peer links,
their network can reach the AS that initiates the coordination process. To answer
the question, the network operators of the AS being asked needs to ask the network
operators of its customers and OC peers the same question. The process finishes
when an AS has no customers nor OC peers or the network operators of an AS finds
that the initial AS is a customer or an OC peer. If the answer to the question is
yes, then the initial AS should not change routing policy due to the potential routing
oscillation.

2.4.3

Establishing OC Peer with Local Coordination

In practice, special peer routing policies are usually deployed among ASes close
to the edge of the Internet. Large ISPs of the high tiers, such as Tier 1 and Tier 2,
might not have incentives and routing requirements to set up OC peers. For these
ASes close to the edge, the coordination process for establishing OC peers does not
have to involve customer ASes. As for the example in Figure 2.2, before Five College
setting up UMASSP DOM as an OC peer, the network operators of Five College need
to coordinate with the network operators of UMASSP DOM. Meanwhile, the network
operators of UMASSP DOM know that their customer ASes are all stub networks
and can not discover an OC cycle through coordinating with the network operators
of these customer ASes. Thus, the network operators of UMASSP DOM needs to
coordinate with the network operators of its OC peers only. If UMASSP DOM does
not set up Five College as an OC peer, then there will not be an OC cycle. Otherwise,
the network operators of Five College know that UMASSP DOM can not be set up
as an OC peer. The cycle checking can be performed among the network operators
of peering ASes within a local scope.
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More general, let us consider in what scenario, an AS can set up a peer link as
an OC peer link without involving customers in the coordination process. We define
a directed cycle as an AS cycle, vn ...v0 , where v0 = vn , that has the following two
properties: (a) ∀i ∈ [0, n − 1], vi+1 is a provider or peer of vi ; (b) ∃i ∈ [0, n − 1] such
that vi+1 is a provider of vi . Namely, the direction of provider-customer links in a
directed cycle is always same. A peer link is an in-loop peer link, if the peer link is
included in a directed cycle.
Corollary 2.4.1. If a peer link is not an in-loop peer link, then when an AS sets
up the peer link as an OC peer link, coordinating with OC peers only is sufficient to
guarantee that the routing policy is safe.
Proof. If setting the peer link as an OC peer link leads to an OC cycle, then the OC
cycle contains peer links only. Otherwise, it will contradict with the condition that
the peer link is not an in-loop peer link. Then, to check the potential OC cycle, it is
enough to coordinate with the network operators of OC peers only.
Typically, an AS peers with ASes that have similar size to exchange a comparable volume of traffic. Furthermore, an AS usually provides transit service to an AS
with smaller size. Then, an AS is unlikely to peer with one of its (direct or indirect) providers [31]. It is not uncommon that peer links are not in-loop peer links.
According to Corollary 2.4.1, when a peer link is not an in-loop peer link, the network operators of an AS coordinate with the network operators of OC peers only for
establishing OC peer.

2.5

Enable Selective Export

In this section, we systematically explore the possibility to enable diverse paths
and the potential flexibility for ranking these newly-enabled paths. We first propose
PeerBoost routing policies that selectively export provider routes to peers, peer routes
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to providers and peer routes to peers respectively. Then, we derive how PeerBoost
policies rank these routes. Instead of being ranked as backup routes, these newlyenabled routes of PeerBoost routing polices can be selected as the best routes. We
derive a sufficient condition for routing convergence. When the condition is satisfied,
the routing system is guaranteed to be safe.

2.5.1

Export Policy

In addition to paths enabled by the Gao-Rexford guidelines, PeerBoost policies
also enable P2R, R2P and R2R export rules. With these P2R, R2P and R2R export
rules, more peer routes are enabled by PeerBoost export policy. In the following,
we illustrate the routes that can be announced to customers, peers and providers
respectively.
We first consider the routes announced to customers. Announcing routes to the
customer gives rise to potential income for transit AS. In the Gao-Rexford guidelines,
ASes announce all routes to their customers. Same with the Gao-Rexford guidelines,
PeerBoost policies enable ASes to announce all routes to their customers.
Now, we consider the routes announced to peers. A settlement-free peering link
between two ASes exchanges traffic between these two ASes and their customers.
Therefore, customer routes can be announced to peers. Beyond that, PeerBoost
policies enable ASes to selectively announce provider routes to peers. Those newlyenabled peer routes are upstream peer routes. Formally, if the first non-peer link of a
peer route from the source AS to the destination AS is a customer-to-provider link,
the peer route is an upstream peer route. In Figure 2.7, we illustrate three examples of
upstream peer routes2 . In addition to announcing provider routes to peers, PeerBoost
policies also enable ASes to selectively announce peer routes to peers.
2

The legends for peer to peer links and provider to customer links are used throughout the rest
of the chapter
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 2.7: Upstream peer routes, where s is the source AS and d is the destination
AS.

Finally, we consider the routes announced to providers. Clearly, the customer
routes can be announced to providers. ASes do not announce provider routes to
another provider, since ASes do not transit the traffic between two of their providers.
Now, let us consider announcing peer routes to providers. There are two kinds of peer
routes: upstream peer routes and downstream peer routes. The upstream peer routes
have been defined in the above paragraph. The rest of peer routes are downstream
peer routes. Namely, if the first non-peer link of a peer route from the source AS
to the destination AS is a provider-to-customer link, the peer route is a downstream
peer route. If all links of a peer route are peer links, we still classify the peer route as
a downstream peer route. In Figure 2.8, we illustrate three examples of downstream
peer routes. ASes can selectively announce downstream peer routes to its providers.
We do not consider that an AS exports an upstream peer route to its providers, since
a pair of peering ASes does not have economic incentives to transit traffic between
their providers through their peer links.
In summary, the export policy have the following three selective export rules.
• An AS can selectively export its peer routes to its peers.
• An AS can selectively export its provider routes to its peers.
• An AS can selectively export its downstream peer routes to its providers.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 2.8: Downstream peer routes, where s is the source AS and d is the destination
AS.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 2.9: Customer routes permitted in PeerBoost policies but not permitted under
Gao-Rexford guidelines, where s is the source AS and d is the destination AS.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 2.10: Three examples of providers routes permitted in PeerBoost policies but
not permitted under Gao-Rexford guidelines, where s is the source AS and d is the
destination AS.
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Figure 2.11: An example of upstream peer routes with steps permitted in PeerBoost
polices but not permitted under the Gao-Rexford guidelines, where s is the source AS
and d is the destination AS.

PeerBoost policies enable almost all possible paths, except the paths indicating
that customers transit traffic for their providers. Namely, PeerBoost policies do not
enable a route, only if the route is generated through announcing a provider route
or an upstream peer route to a provider. PeerBoost policies are still valley-free. In
a valid PeerBoost path, all customer-provider links have to come before all providercustomer links, while peer links can be arbitrarily interspersed along the path.
Any route that is permitted under the Gao-Rexford guidelines is permitted in
PeerBoost policies. Besides, additional routes are enabled by the P2R, R2R and
R2P export rules. Since P2R rules enables an AS to announce a provider route to
a peer, upstream peer routes, such as routes in Figure 2.7 (a) and Figure 2.7 (b)
are enabled. R2R and R2P rules enable more downstream peer routes, such as the
route in Figure 2.8 (c). Besides of enabling additional peer routes, more customer
and provider routes are permitted in PeerBoost policies. Figure 2.9 illustrates three
examples of customer routes enabled in PeerBoost policies and Figure 2.10 illustrates
three examples of provider routes enabled in PeerBoost policies.
When an AS exports routes by following the P2R, R2R and R2P export rules,
the resulting route starts with a step. A step of a route is a two-link segment of the
route, if the two links from the source to the destination are one of the following three
cases:
• a provider-customer link followed by a peer link.
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• a peer link followed by another peer link.
• a peer link followed by a customer-provider link.
We refer to the AS between the two links of a step as the pivot of the step. For
example, Figure 2.11 illustrates an upstream peer route that contains four steps,
where AS 1 is the pivot of the step, s-1-2 and AS 6 is the pivot of the step, 5-6-d.

2.5.2

Import Policy

In the following, we discuss how to rank the routes enabled in PeerBoost policies.

2.5.2.1

Ranking Routes Based on Steps

When an AS announces a route by following P2R, R2R and R2P rules, the resulting route starts with a step and the AS is the pivot of the step. The pivot AS
might want the resulting route to be used as a preferred route. Alternatively, the
pivot AS might want the resulting route to be a backup. To do that, the pivot can
determine whether a step is a preferred step or a backup step. Through determining
a step as a backup step of a route, the pivot AS can inform the AS receiving the
route announcement that the route should be treated as a backup choice. On the
contrary, through determining a step as a preferred step, the pivot AS can inform
its neighbor that the route is not treated as a backup choice. For example, in the
routing system of Figure 2.12, the peer route, A-B-D, with a step can be preferred
over the provider route, A-C-D, when the step is a preferred step. Note, the step is
also proposed in [30]. However, the routing policy proposed in [30] always prefers a
route without a step over routes with steps.
A route might contain multiple backup steps. We refer to the number of backup
steps in a route as backup level of the route. A route with lower backup level is
preferred over the routes with higher backup level.
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Figure 2.12: Prefer peer routes with steps over provider routes

2.5.2.2

Ranking Routes With Same Backup Level

In the following, we discuss how to rank routes with the same backup level.
2.5.2.2.1

Ranking customer and provider routes Considering only customer

routes and provider routes, ASes prefer customer routes over provider routes due to
the economic incentives. That is, given two customer routes, the AS can rank those
two routes in any order. It is same for two provider routes.
2.5.2.2.2

Ranking upstream peer routes Now, we consider how to rank var-

ious upstream peer routes enabled by PeerBoost policies. When an upstream peer
route is selected to deliver the traffic, a peer AS might pay its provider for the transit.
Thus, customer routes are preferred over upstream peer routes.
2.5.2.2.3

Ranking downstream peer routes When an AS announces a down-

stream peer route to a peer or a provider without increasing the backup level of the
route, we refer to the downstream peer route as preferred downstream peer route of
the AS. The AS allows its neighbors to prefer the route extended from the preferred
downstream peer route. The AS itself should prefer the preferred downstream peer
route. Thus, a preferred downstream peer route is preferred over all provider routes
and upstream peer routes. The rest of downstream peer routes can be ranked in any
order.
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2.5.2.3

PeerBoost Import Policy

In summary, ASes determine the route ranking by following the import policy
rules step by step.
• An AS prefers routes with lower backup level.
• An AS prefers customer routes and preferred downstream peer routes over
provider routes and upstream peer routes.
In the following, we describe how to implement the import policy. The key is to
let ASes know enough information of each route, so that each AS can rank routes
based on the import policy. To do that, we use the community attribute of BGP
announcements to convey the necessary information.
To rank routes, an AS needs to know the backup level of each route. However, the
AS might not know the relationship between ASes along the route and thus do not
know the backup level. We can use the community attribute of BGP announcement
to carry the number of backup steps in a route. Namely, when an AS announces a
route, the number of backup steps keeps unchanged (for preferred steps) or increases
by one (for backup steps).
In addition to the backup level, to rank a peer route, an AS needs to know whether
the route is a downstream peer route or an upstream peer route. To do that, we also
use the community attribute of BGP announcement to carry the information. More
specifically, when an AS announces a provider route or an upstream peer route to a
peer, the AS informs the receiving AS that it is an upstream peer route. Alternatively,
when an AS announces a customer route or a downstream peer route to a peer, the
AS informs the receiving AS that it is a downstream peer route.
The semantics of using BGP communities for PeerBoost policy is only defined and
used between neighboring ASes. Thus, when an AS announces a route to its neighbor,
the associated BGP communities should be guaranteed to reflect the properties (e.g.
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(a) Safe

(b) Unsafe

Figure 2.13: Routing systems in which provider routes are exported to peers.

Figure 2.14: An unsafe routing sysmte (BAD GADGET) in which provider routes
are exported to peers

the backup level and the type of peer route) of the route. While the BGP communities
might influence routing in unintended ways [87], it is widely used to convey various
information between neighboring ASes. When ASes assign BGP communities by
following the routing policies, the potential disadvantages can be mitigated.

2.5.3

Convergence Analysis

Whether a routing system observing PeerBoost policy is guaranteed to be safe
is determined by how the pivot ASes determine the types of these steps. In the
following, we will discuss the convergence conditions in terms of the pivot decisions.

2.5.3.1

Convergence Under R2R and P2R Rule

Announcing provider routes or upstream peer routes to peers do not imply that
the routing system is not safe. For example, in the routing system of Figure 2.13 (a),
AS B announces the provider route B-D to the peer, AS A, without increasing the
backup level. However, you might not be able to set up those special arrangement
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(a) Safe

(b) Unsafe

Figure 2.15: Routing systems in which downstream peer routes are exported to
providers.

everywhere in the routing system. When those special arrangement forms a cycle, the
system might not be safe. When AS A announces a provider or upstream peer route
to its peer, AS P, without increasing backup level, AS P is an uphill preferred peer
(UP Peer) of AS A. In the example of Figure 2.13 (b), both A and B treat each other
as an UP Peer. In addition, the routing system is not safe, since it is a DISAGREE
system in [46]. Namely, the UP Peer relationship forms a cycle and it might lead to
routing oscillation. More generally, the cycle might contain customer-provider links.
In the routing system of Figure 2.14, AS B announces the provider route, B-D, to
its UP Peer, AS A, and AS A prefers the resulting route, A-B-D, over its provider
route, A-D. The routing system is a BAD GADGET and is not safe [46]. We define
that a generic uphill (GU) cycle is an AS cycle, vn ...v0 , where v0 = vn and for each
i ∈ [0, n − 1], vi+1 is a customer or an UP Peer of vi .
2.5.3.2

Convergence Under R2R and R2P Rules

Announcing downstream peer routes to peer and providers do not imply that the
routing system is not safe. For example, in the routing system of Figure 2.15 (a),
although the route B-D is a preferred downstream peer route and is announced to
the provider, AS A, the routing system is safe. If AS B changes its route ranking a
little bit to prefer B-C-D over B-D, then the routing system is not safe. That is, the
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Figure 2.16: A safe routing system with GU cycles.

routing system in Figure 2.15 (b) forms a BAD GADGET system and is not safe. If
AS A prefers a downstream peer route from a peer, AS P, over a customer route or a
preferred downstream peer route, then AS P is a downhill preferred peer (DP Peer) of
AS A. For example, AS C is a DP peer of AS B in the routing system of Figure 2.15
(b). When the DP peer link and the provider-customer link forms a cycle, such as
A-B-C-A in Figure 2.15 (b), the routing system might not be safe.

Formally, we

define a generic downhill (GD) cycle as an AS cycle, vn ...v0 , where v0 = vn and for
each i ∈ [0, n − 1], vi is a customer or a DP peer of vi+1 .
2.5.3.3

Convergence Condition

Then, we derive the convergence condition for PeerBoost policies.
Theorem 2.5.1. A PeerBoost routing policy is safe, if there are neither GD cycles
nor GU cycles.
We provide the proof in A.2.
The absence of GD and GU cycles is a sufficient but not necessary condition for
routing convergence. A routing system with OC cycles might be guaranteed to be
safe. For example, in Figure 2.16, the routing system contains a GU cycle, A-B-CA. However, the routing system is safe. Note, different from the routing system in
Figure 2.14, AS B prefers the route B-D over all the other routes. Although there is a
GU cycle, the routing system always converges to the state, where A chooses A-B-D,
B chooses B-D and C chooses C-D. Even if there are link or node failures, the routing
system converges. Thus, the routing system is safe.
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When the network operators of an AS want to change the routing polcies, to guarantee the PeerBoost policy to be safe, the network operators need to check whether
the policy change leads to a GD or GU cycle. GU cycle includes provider-customer
links and UP peer links only. Therefore, only when an AS wants to set up a customer or an UP peer, the network operators of the AS need to initiate a coordination
process to check whether there will be a GU cycle. Similar to the coordination for
checking OC cycle, the network operators of the AS ask the network operators of its
customers and UP peers whether, through provider-customer links and UP peer links,
their networks can reach the AS that initiates the coordination process. GD cycle
includes provider-customer links and DP peer links only. Therefore, only when an AS
wants to set up a customer or a DP peer, the network operators of the AS need to
initiate a coordination process to check whether there will be a GD cycle. Similarly,
the network operators of the AS ask the network operators of its customers and DP
peers whether, through provider-customer links and DP peer links, their networks
can reach the AS that initiates the coordination process.

2.5.4

Establishing UP Peer and DP Peer with Local Coordination

In practice, special peer routing policies are usually deployed among ASes close to
the edge of the Internet. In that case, the coordination process for establishing UP
peers and DP peers do not have to involve customer ASes. For example, in Figure 2.1,
if UVM exports the provider routes from Internet2 to MC without increasing backup
level, then UVM needs to coordinate with MC only to check whether there is a GU
cycle. When UVM wants MC to access Internet2 through itself, UVM might export
routes from Internet2 to MC without increasing the backup level. Thus, MC is an
UP peer of UVM. To guarantee the routing system to be safe, the network operators
of UVM need to coordinate with the network operators of MC and check whether
there is a GU cycle. To do that, the network operators of UVM need to coordinate
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with the network operators of MC only, since MC is a stub network and no more UP
peer of MC will be involved in the coordination. The cycle checking can be performed
among the network operators of peering ASes within a local scope.
Corollary 2.5.1. If a peer link is not an in-loop peer link, then when an AS sets up
the peer link as a UP peer link, coordinating with UP peers only can guarantee that
the routing policy is safe.
Corollary 2.5.2. If a peer link is not an in-loop peer link, then when an AS sets up
the peer link as a DP peer link, coordinating with DP peers only can guarantee that
the routing policy is safe.
According to Corollary 2.5.1 and Corollary 2.5.2, when a peer link is not an inloop peer link, the network operators of an AS coordinate with the network operators
of UP peers or DP peers only for setting the peer as an UP peer or a DP peer.

2.6

Enable Sibling

A pair of neighboring ASes might want to export all its routes to each other. In
this case, the pair of ASes have a sibling relationship. In this section, we propose
routing policies to accommodate sibling relationships.
Clearly, a pair of siblings transit for each other and therefore announce all routes
to each other. In the following, we focus on how to rank routes going through sibling
links, so that the routing system is safe.
We propose a hierarchical sibling routing policy in this section. A cluster of
sibling ASes managed by an organization or several closely related organizations can
be treated as one entity. Outside of the sibling cluster, we safely apply PeerBoost
routing policies to accommodate provider-customer and peer to peer relationships
through local coordination. Then, within a cluster of sibling ASes, to set up sibling
policies, ASes need to coordinate only with siblings.
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2.6.1

AS Hierarchy

A sibling cluster is a set of ASes owned by an organization or several closely related
organizations, where any AS in the set can reach another AS in the set through sibling
links only. We assume that if two ASes in the same sibling cluster are connected
through a link, then the link is a sibling link. Note, ASes within a sibling cluster do
not have to be fully connected. Namely, even if in a sibling cluster, AS A and AS B
are siblings, and AS B and AS C are also siblings, it does not mean that A and C are
directly connected.

2.6.2

Policy Rules

The export policy for sibling relationships are clear. That is, ASes announce all
routes to its siblings. For the other relationships, we can apply PeerBoost routing
policies. In the following, we focus on the import policy of the hierarchical sibling
policies.
Since we separate the convergence problem into two levels, let us first partition the
routes according to these two levels. In hierarchical sibling routing policies, a route
that only contains sibling links is an internal route. The other routes are external
routes which go through multiple sibling clusters. The internal routes are always
preferred over external routes. That is, for any destination, the routes that only go
through siblings should be preferred. It is analogous to that, to reach a destination
within the same domain, a router will no go through routers of another AS.
Now, we consider how to rank external routes. The path of an external route can
be separated into an internal segment and an external segment. The internal segment
is the sequence of sibling links starting from the first AS in the route. The rest of the
path is the external segment.
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ASes first rank routes based on their external segments and use the internal segments to break tie. More specifically, we use PeerBoost import policy to rank the
external segments.
To rank internal segments, each AS will assign a ranking for its siblings. ASes
can determine the ranking of their siblings based on their routing requirements. For
example, if an AS prefers using a larger sibling to access the rest of the Internet, then
an AS can prefer a sibling with larger size over a sibling with smaller size.
Based on the ranking of its siblings, an AS classifies all siblings into preferred
siblings and backup siblings, where an AS prefers the preferred siblings over the backup
siblings. Each route uses sibling backup level (SBL) to represent backup siblings along
the route. When a route is exported from a backup sibling to another backup sibling,
SBL is increased by one. Otherwise, SBL keeps unchanged. When a route is exported
into a new sibling cluster, SBL of the route is initialized as 0.
In sum, ASes determine the route ranking by following the import policy rules
step by step.
• An AS prefers routes with lower backup level.
• An AS prefers internal routes over customer routes and preferred peer routes
over provider routes and upstream peer routes.
• An AS prefers routes with lower SBL.
• An AS prefers routes from neighbors that are not siblings over routes from
preferred siblings over routes from backup siblings.

2.6.3

Convergence Condition

The hierarchical sibling policies are not guaranteed to be safe. To illustrate with
an example, Figure 2.17 shows a routing system that follows a hierarchical sibling
policy. Clearly, it is a BAD GADGET, which means it is unsafe. Note that in this
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Figure 2.17: BAD GADGET with a preferred sibling cycle.

Figure 2.18: An example of generic downstream sibling cycles.

example, the preferred sibling relationships form a cycle, A-B-C-A. We define that
a preferred sibling (PS) cycle is an AS cycle, vn ...v0 , where v0 = vn and for each
i ∈ [0, n − 1], vi is a preferred sibling of vi+1 . As shown in Figure 2.17, a PS cycle
might lead to routing oscillation.
In addition to PS cycles, GD or GU cycles should be avoided as shown in Section 2.5. Here, we extend the definition of UP Peers and DP peers in the hierarchical
sibling policy. To do so, we treat all ASes within a sibling cluster as a clusterAS. When two ASes in different cluster-ASes are connected, the relationship of two
cluster-ASes are defined by the relationship of the two ASes. Then, UP Peers can be
defined among the cluster-AS. Namely, when a cluster-AS A announces a provider or
upstream peer route to its peer, cluster-AS P, without increasing backup level, the
cluster-AS P is an uphill preferred peer (UP Peer) of the cluster-AS A. Similarly, the
other concepts, such as DP peers, can be extended to cluster-ASes. Accordingly, we
can define GD and GU cycles in terms of the hierarchical sibling policy.
Theorem 2.6.1. A hierarchical sibling policy is guaranteed to be safe, if there are no
PS, GD or GU cycles.
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We provide the proof in A.3.
When the network operators of an AS want to change the routing policies, to
guarantee the routing policy to be safe, the network operators need to check whether
the policy change leads to a PS, GD or GU cycle. Within a sibling cluster, to avoid the
PS cycle, ASes coordinate with their siblings only. Figure 2.17 illustrates a PS cycle,
A-B-C-A. Local coordination among A, B and C can avoid the cycle. For example,
A can decrease the ranking for B and set B to be a backup sibling. Note, the routing
policy of sibling links within a sibling cluster does not impact the existence of a GD
cycle or a GU cycle. Figure 2.18 illustrates an example of generic downstream sibling
cycle. In this example, as long as A and C are both siblings of B, the AS cycle,
A-B-C-E-D-A, is a GD cycle. Outside of the sibling cluster, to avoid the GD and GU
cycles, the network operators of ASes in the cluster-ASes need to coordinate with the
network operators of ASes in the customer cluster-ASes and the peer cluster-ASes as
described in Section 2.5.

2.7

Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the flexibility of the proposed routing policies. To
evaluate the flexibility of a routing policy, we consider the number of possible routing
configurations that can be applied to an AS when the AS follows the routing policy. If
a routing policy enables more possible configurations that an AS can set up, then the
routing policy has the greater flexibility. In Section 2.7.1, we describe how to count
the possible configurations. In Section 2.7.2, we show the number of the possible
configurations for ASes under various routing policies.

2.7.1

Counting Possible Configurations

To count the possible configurations of an AS, we consider both the export policy
and the import policy of the AS. In the following, we propose the models for the
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export policy and the import policy of an AS respectively. Based on that, we count
the routing configurations of an AS.
Routing policies mentioned in this chapter, such as Gao-Rexford guidelines, safe
backup policy and PeerBoost, all allow different configurations for the neighbors with
the same agreement. For example, under these routing policies, an AS can always
prefer one customer over another customer. Also, an AS can always prefer a provider
over another provider. In order to focus on the difference of these routing policies,
when we count the possible policy configurations, we assume that an AS sets up the
routing policy for its neighbors based on the agreement established with the neighbors.
Then, an AS will use the same routing configuration for its neighbors with the same
agreement.
The export policy of an AS determines whether the routes from a neighbor can
be announced to another neighbor and whether the backup level of the announced
route is increased. Thus, we model the export policy configuration of an AS as a
vector of announcement choices. We denote each announcement choice as ci,j which
indicates the export policy configuration about the routes from neighbor group i to
neighbor group j. Each neighbor group is a set of neighbors with the same agreement
relationships, such as providers, peers and customers.
There are three possible values for the announcement choice, ci,j , as follows.
• ci,j = 0: the routes from neighbor group i are not announced to neighbor group
j.
• ci,j = 1: the routes from neighbor group i can be announced to neighbor group
j while the backup level is increased.
• ci,j = 2: the routes from neighbor group i can be announced to neighbor group
j while the backup level is not increased.
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The import policy of an AS determines how the AS ranks the routes from the
neighbors. We model the import policy configuration of an AS as a vector of neighbors
which indicates the ranking of the routes from different neighbor groups. Namely, if
a neighbor group i is the first item in the vector, the routes from neighbor group i
are preferred over the routes from the other neighbor groups in the vector.
Let us take MC network in Figure 2.1 as an example to illustrate how to count the
possible configurations. Assume that MC does not have any other neighbor except
LEVEL 3 and UVM. When MC follows Gao-Rexford guidelines, there is only one
possible export configuration. Namely, MC does not announce any routers from one
neighbor to the other. Similarly, there is only 3 possible import configurations when
MC follows Gao-Rexford guidelines. Namely, MC prefers LEVEL 3 over UVM, prefers
UVM over LEVEL 3 or assigns the same local preference for LEVEL 3 and UVM.
Combing all possible import configurations and all possible export configurations,
there are only 3 possible routing configurations for MC. Alternatively, if MC follows
PeerBoost policies, then there are 9 possible export configurations. The reason is
that MC might apply R2P and P2R export rules, and selects the backup level of the
announced routes. Accordingly, there are 3 possible import configurations when MC
follows PeerBoost policies. In sum, there are 27 routing configurations of MC.

2.7.2

Possible Configurations on the Internet

We use the Internet topologies to evaluate the flexibility of Gao-Rexford guidelines [31], safe backup routing [30, 60], FlexibleRC and PeerBoost. We measure the
number of possible configurations of ASes in the Internet topologies. The Internet
topologies and the AS relationships are derived from CAIDA dataset [13].
We show the number of AS configurations on average in Figure 2.19. As Figure 2.19 shows, safe backup routing, FlexibleRC and PeerBoost have the greater flexibility than Gao-Rexford guidelines. Safe backup routing, FlexibleRC and PeerBoost
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Figure 2.19: The average number of possible routing configurations for ASes in various
Internet topologies.

enable more possible routing configurations, since they extend Gao-Rexford guidelines
in terms of the import policy rules and/or the export policy rules. PeerBoost policies
allow the greatest flexibility among these policies. Comparing to Gao-Rexford guidelines, PeerBoost policies increase the number of possible configurations by nearly 2
times.

2.8

Related Work

The evolution of the Internet architecture from a hierarchical to a flat structure
has been noticed for years [59, 18, 6, 33, 55]. Not only stub networks, but also ISPs
are using an open peering strategy to peer with more networks [62]. Dynam-IX [66]
is proposed to facilitate operators to speed up peering establishment. Ahmed et
al. investigate the performance difference between peering and transit interconnections [5]. For more than 90% ASes, peering paths outperform transit paths in terms
of propagation delay, which provides one reason of the evolution.
Network operators and researchers are exploring the flexible usage of these peer
links. For example, recently, large content providers, such as Google, Facebook and
Akamai, try to exploit the peer links in a more flexible way [103, 77, 99]. They focus
on a single network or several networks managed by an organization. Given the flat
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structure of the current Internet, we systematically explore flexible routing policies
with convergence guarantee that can take advantage of these peer links in a global
perspective.
A number of studies propose routing policy guidelines considering practical contractual commercial agreements between ASes. Gao and Rexford propose a prefercustomer and valley-free routing policy to accommodate provider-customer and peer
to peer relationships [31]. After that, additional backup routes are enabled with a
lower ranking [30] while sibling relationships are accommodated in [60, 84]. In addition, [82] enables peer routes to be preferred over customer routes and keep the
stability of the routing system through detecting recurrent routing loops. In this
chapter, we propose PeerBoost policies to enable both flexible import policy and flexible export policy. In contrast to backup routes enabled in [30], these newly-enabled
routes in PeerBoost policies can be assigned with more flexible ranking. For example,
the newly-enabled routes can be selected as the most preferred route when all steps
are treated as preferred steps. [60] and [84] rank sibling-sibling policies according
to the number of sibling links or the AS-PATH length. Sibling policies proposed in
this chapter, by contrast, enable more flexible route ranking. For example, in the
hierarchical sibling policies, the route preference of a route does not decrease when
the route is received from a preferred sibling. As a result, routes with more sibling
links can be preferred over that with less sibling links.
Wang et al. relax the preferring-customer import policy by allowing each AS to
customize the route selection on behalf of each neighbor [96]. Mahajan et al. exploit
the negotiation between neighbor ASes to find a best route which minimizes the cost
of all ASes along the route [64, 65]. They focus on how to select a route flexibly
through AS coordination. We explore the local coordination among ASes to enable
both diverse paths and flexible route ranking.
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To study the safety property of path-vector protocols, researchers proposed a
number of abstract methods, including routing algebra [83, 45, 41, 81] and Simple
Path Vector Protocols (SPVP) [43, 42]. These theoretical tools can be used to analyze
whether a routing system is guaranteed to be safe and derive the conditions. We
exploit the theoretical tools to derive simplified conditions which can be checked
through local coordination without requiring all routing policies.
Since BGP protocol does not guarantee convergence property, there are several
existing work [44, 24, 82] extend BGP protocol to resolve the convergence problem
through detecting oscillations in the BGP routing system. We propose routing policies
that enable network operators to avoid potential routing oscillations.
The model of inter-domain routing policy is exploited in various research areas,
such as inter-domain protocols [102, 89, 54, 39], inter-domain security schemes [22,
34, 63], inter-domain routing verification [98, 79] and Internet path reliability [57, 60].
PeerBoost policies proposed in this chapter can be used to synthesize routing policies
of the Internet for various research purposes. Although PeerBoost provides more
choices for routing policies, we do not expect it significantly change on major results
in experiments, since our safe conditions limit the extent that flexible routing policies
can be applied.
A long research thread [29, 88, 26, 21, 20, 19, 8, 36, 53, 70] has aimed to infer
the relationship between the ASes from publicly available information, such as BGP
routing tables and IXP database. According to the expression of the routing policy,
the AS interconnections are classified into three relationship: provider-customer, peer
to peer and sibling to sibling. It has long been recognized that peer to peer and sibling
relationships are hard to be identified. The flexible routing policies described in this
chapter could be one of the reasons for the challenge to discover peer or sibling links.
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2.9

Conclusion

We propose policy-rich routing through local coordination among ASs. More
specifically, we systematically broaden routing policies to allow ASs to enable these
potential routes and take advantage of all routes with great flexibility.
First of all, we propose FlexibleRC policies to provide more flexibility for ranking
peer routes. In addition, we propose PeerBoost routing policies to enable selective
export for providers and peers. Finally, we propose hierarchical sibling polices to
accommodate sibling relationships. We derive convergence conditions for all above
policies and propose the cycle-checking scheme to show that the local coordination
among neighboring ASs and siblings is sufficient to guarantee the safeness of the
routing system.
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CHAPTER 3
VERIFYING POLICY-BASED ROUTING AT INTERNET
SCALE

3.1

Introduction

Policy-based routing protocols, such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), allow
network administrators/operators to configure flexible routing policies independently.
The route taken by a packet to traverse in the Internet is determined by the distributed route selection process, and a result of complex interactions controlled by
the configured policies. However, each network sets its own routing policies with little
or no coordination with other networks. It is therefore challenging to understand how
a network’s routing policies might impact routes of other networks.
The paths/routes resulted from these independently configured routing policies
might not necessarily meet the intent of the network administrators/operators. For
example, a pair of networks might not be able to reach each other due to routing policy
misconfiguration. Indeed, the policy misconfiguration of a single network might lead
to a widespread outage in the Internet [9]. Further, a network might have a few
desirable goals when setting its routing policy. For example, it might want to ensure
that its traffic from a specific content provider such as Google not to use a specific
provider. Nevertheless, before the policy setting, the network operator does not know
whether their policy configuration can meet the goal. It is beneficial to verify whether
the goal can be satisfied through the policy configuration.
Formal methods can provide a sound and thorough verification to questions whether
the intent of a network is satisfied through exhaustive search. Researchers propose
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a number of formal methods to study and analyze the BGP routing system. To
study the safety property of BGP systems, Satisfiable Module Theories (SMT) [93]
and Rewriting Logic [92, 94, 95] are used to verify the convergence conditions of the
system. Recently, [11, 98] propose to verify network configurations through modeling
routing behavior with SMT constraints.
These proposed models for BGP routing verification can typically handle up to
thousands of routers at most. It would be challenging to verify routing properties at
Internet scale where there are tens of thousands networks and each network consists
of tens to thousands of routers.
In this chapter, we propose policy-aware models that translate the network verification problem into a set of SMT constraints, and perform the network verification
through solving the SMT problem. In order to scale the verification system, our
policy-aware model reduces the mutual dependencies between variables considering
routing policy constraints in the Internet. In other words, we explicitly account for
routing policy constraints in constructing the SMT constraints. In particular, we construct a series of policy-aware models for various routing policies. First, we consider
routing policies that follow Gao-Rexford guideline [31]. We then generalize the model
to capture routing policies beyond Gao-Rexford guideline. Furthermore, we propose
an approach to prune the generated SMT model so as to accelerate the SMT solver.
We implement the verification toolkit based on a SMT solver, Z3 [17], and evaluate
the policy-aware model through verifications on network topologies of various sizes.
The experimental results show that the policy-aware model can reduce the time it
takes to perform verifications by as much as 100x even under a modest topology with
a thousand nodes. Further, we show that it is feasible to deploy the model at Internet
scale. It takes only a few minutes to answer a query for a topology containing tens
of thousands of nodes.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes a basic
SMT-based model for BGP. Section 3.3 introduces the policy-aware model through
describing the biNode model for routing policies that follow Gao-Rexford guideline.
After that, in Section 3.4, we expand the biNode model to accommodate any routing
policy. In Section 3.5, we describe how to specify a query for a verification problem. In
Section 3.6, we introduce the optimization technique to eliminate irrelevant variables
in the model. We implement the verification toolkits based on the policy-aware model
and evaluate the model in Section 3.7. We discuss related work in Section 3.8 and
conclude in Section 3.9.

3.2

A Topology-based Model

To verify policy configuration based on SMT, a system of SMT constraints are
generated from the routing policy configuration and the properties of the routing
behavior supposed to satisfy. In this section, we introduce a common method to
characterize BGP routing behavior.
To model the routing behavior through SMT constraints, we represent the best
route of each router and all route announcements between BGP neighbors as variables.
Then, for each router, to model the import policy and route selection, the constraints
are generated among the best route and all received route announcements while to
model the export policy, the constraints are generated among the best route and
the route announcements derived from the best route. We refer to these models as
topology-based models which are proposed in both Bagpipe [98] and Minesweeper [11].

3.2.1

Modeling Routes

Symbolic records are used to represent the best routes, the received routes from
BGP neighbors and the route announcements to BGP neighbors. We represent the
route announced from a router i to its neighbor j, as a record, ri,j , which is a collection
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(a) A topology example.

(b) Dependency graph of the topology-based model
for (a).

Figure 3.1: The topology-based model and its dependency graph.

Table 3.1: Symbolic variables in the model.
Variable
r.length
r.pref
r.nexthop
r.origin
r.med
r.distance
r.rid
r.ibgp
r.valid

Description
AS path length for r
Local preference for r
The first AS in AS Path of r
Origin Type of r
BGP MED attribute for r
IGP distance of r
Neighbor router ID for r
Whether r is learned via IBGP
Whether r has a valid route

Representation
[0,2ˆ16)
[0,2ˆ16)
[0,2ˆ32)
[0,2ˆ2)
[0,2ˆ32)
[0,2ˆ32)
[0,2ˆ32)
1 bit
1 bit

of variables. In addition, for each router i, the record, besti represents the best route
among routes received from all neighbors. Figure 3.1(a) illustrates a topology example
with four nodes that represent four routers respectively. In the topology, node 1 and
node 4 peer with each other and announce routes to each other. We use r1,4 to
represent the route announced from node 1 to node 4 and r4,1 to represent the route
announced from node 4 to node 1.
Table 3.1 lists the variables of a record that represents the basic information within
a route or a route announcement. For node i, that owns the destination d, besti is
the origin route. The constraints are as follows.
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Origin(i) ⇐⇒ besti .length = 0 ∧

(3.1)

besti .nexthop = 0 ∧ besti .valid ∧ besti .pref = 216 − 1

3.2.2

Modeling Import Policy and Route Selection

Following the import policy, each router assigns a local preference to the routes
that are received from external BGP neighbors. We model the import policy of node
i
i as the function, fimport
(r).

The best route of a router is selected from the received routes. The route selection
of BGP protocol selects the best route by following a sequence of rules. In general,
besti can be a function of all routes received by node i.

i
besti = fselection ({fimport
(rj,i )|j ∈ N eighbor(i)})

(3.2)

where, fselection represents the route selection procedure of BGP, and N eighbor(i) is
the set of nodes that have a directed edge to node i. That is, besti depends on all
routes received by node i.

3.2.3

Modeling Export Policy

The export policy determines whether a route is announced to neighbors and
how to derive the route announcement from the best route. For example, a router
announces a route received from an internal BGP neighbor to its external BGP neighbors, but does not announce the route to its internal BGP neighbor. When a best
route can be announced to a neighbor according to the export policy, the announced
route will be derived from the best route. For example, the length of the announced
route will be increased by one when the route is announced to an external BGP
neighbor.
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In general, all routes that are announced by node i to its neighbors, are functions
of besti .

i,j
ri,j = fexport
(besti )

(3.3)

i,j
where, fexport
represents the export policy of node i for its neighbor j. Thus, the

routes exported by node i depends on besti .
3.2.4

Dependency Graph

To explore the variable dependency in a model, we represent a model into the
dependency graph, which is a directed graph where a node represents the best route
of a router and a directed edge from node i to node j represents the route announced
from i to j.
In a topology-based model, as Equation (3.2) shows, the best route of a router
can be determined when all routes received by the router are determined. The change
of any received route might lead to the change of the best route. That is, the best
route of a router depends on the routes received. In addition, as Equation (3.3)
shows, the routes announced by a router are derived from the best route of the router
based on its export policy. That is, the routes announced by a router depend on its
best route. Apparently, the dependency between records is transitive. Suppose that
router a announces a route to its neighbor, b. The announced route, ra,b , depends
on besta while bestb depends on ra,b . As a result, bestb depends on besta . Similarly,
besta also depends on bestb . In the topology-based model, the best routes of a pair of
BGP neighbors depend on each other through the routes announced between them.
Namely, the variable dependency is mutual.
Figure 3.1(b) illustrates the dependency graph of the topology-based model for
the topology in Figure 3.1(a). We say that a pair of neighboring ASs is mutual
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dependent, if the pair of nodes representing these two ASs forms a directed cycle in
the dependency graph of the model.

3.2.5

Limitation of Topology-based Model

Given a system of SMT constraints derived from the verification problem, SMT
solver tries to determine whether there is a satisfiable assignment for all variables to
satisfy all constraints. The solving process consists of two iterative steps: inferring
the assignments for variables that are determined by the constraints and guessing assignments for the other variables. According to the system of SMT constraints, some
variables are determined by the input constraints directly. For example, as Equation (3.1) shows, the origin route is always valid. If no more assignments for variables
can be inferred by the constraints, then the solver will guess a temporary assignment
for a variable that has not be determined. Then, the solver continues to infer the
assignments for variables based on the constraints and the current assignments. For
example, in the topology of Figure 3.1(a), if the SMT solver guesses values for r1,3 and
r4,3 , then best3 is determined by the constraints derived from import policy of node
3. The inferring process continues if there are the assignments for variables that can
be directly inferred from the constraints and all resulting assignments. After that,
the solver guesses a temporary assignment for a variable again.
The process continues until no more variables can get a satisfiable assignment or
all variables have the satisfiable assignments. If all variables have the satisfiable assignments, then the verification answer is SAT. However, the temporary assignments
by guess might not always lead to a satisfiable assignment. In that case, the SMT
solver needs to try other possible values for these temporary assignments. That is,
multiple guesses for the variables might be necessary to solve the problem.
In the topology-based model, only the variables representing the origin route can
be directly inferred through the constraints. After that, the SMT solver starts to
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guess temporary assignments for the other variables. However, the ubiquitous cycles
in the model might require the SMT solver to try numerous possible assignments for
those variables before deriving the answer to the verification question.

3.3

BiNode Model for Policies Following Gao-Rexford Guideline

In this section, we propose a policy-aware model for routing policies that follows Gao-Rexford guideline. We refer to the model as biNode model. For simplicity
of exposition, we ignore the internal BGP sessions and model each network as one
router/node.
Provider-customer (PC) relationship and peer-peer (PP) relationship are two common agreements between Autonomous Systems (ASs) in the Internet. Within a PC
relationship, an AS as the customer pays its provider to access the rest of the Internet. Within a PP relationship, two connected ASs exchange traffic from their own
customers for free. There are two rules in Gao-Rexford guideline.
• GR Preference: an AS prefers customer routes over peer and provider routes.
• GR Export: peer and provider routes are exported to customers only.
In the following, we will explore how to transform the routing policies that follow GR
Preference and GR Export into the biNode model.

3.3.1

BiNode Model Construction

The key idea of the biNode model is to reduce the mutual dependency among
variables of neighbors ASs in the dependency graph. To do that, we represent AS i
in the topology-based model by two nodes, the upside node i and the downside node
i0 , in the biNode model. besti0 represents the best customer route of AS i and besti
represents the best route among all routes received by AS i.
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In the following, we first analyze the dependency of variables in the biNode model
and illustrate the dependency graph of the biNode model. After that, we describe
how to derive constraints of the biNode model from the dependency graph.

3.3.1.1

Policy-aware Dependency

When we use an upside node and a downside node to represent the best route and
the best customer route of an AS respectively, we derive the dependency of each node
based on the routing policy of the AS. When the routing policies follow Gao-Rexford
guideline, the best customer routes depends on routes from customers only while peer
routes and provider routes are not announced to peers or providers. As a result, in
the dependency graph, the upside node of an AS might depend on the downside node
of its neighbor. However, the downside node of an AS will not depend on the upside
node of its neighbor.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the dependency of the upside node and the downside node of
AS x, where p1 ...pn are providers of x, r1 ...rn are peers of x and c1 ...cn are customers
of x. The downside node of x depends on the downside node of its customers, such as
c01 and c0n , since the customers of x announce only customer routes to x. Alternatively,
the upside node of x depends on the upside node of its providers, such as p1 and pn ,
since the providers of x announce all routes to x. In addition, the upside node of x
depends on the downside node of its peers, such as r10 and rn0 , since the peers of x
announce only customer routes to x.

3.3.1.2

Dependency Graph of BiNode Model

The routing policy determines the dependency graph of biNode model. In the
following, we illustrate the dependency for neighboring ASs with PC relationship
and PP relationship respectively. Based on that, we illustrate how to generate the
dependency graph for a network of nodes.
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Figure 3.2: Dependency of the downside node and the upside node of x.

3.3.1.2.1

Dependency for a pair of PC nodes We consider a pair of nodes,

p and c, where p is a provider of c. Figure 3.3 shows the dependency among p, p0 ,
c and c0 . We use the directed edge from the downside node to the upside node to
represent that the best route among all routes depends on the best customer routes.
Thus, rc0 ,c = bestc0 and rp0 ,p = bestp0 .
We use the directed edge, rc0 ,p0 , from c0 to p0 , to represent the route announcements
from a customer to its provider. We use the directed edge, rp,c , from p to c, to represent
the route announcements from a provider to its customer.
3.3.1.2.2

Dependency for a pair of PP nodes We consider a pair of nodes, x

and y, with a PP relationship. Figure 3.4 shows the dependency among x, x0 , y and
y 0 . We use the directed edge from the downside node to the upside node to represent
that the best route among all routes depends on the best customer routes. Thus,
rx0 ,x = bestx0 and ry0 ,y = besty0 .
We use rx0 ,y and ry0 ,x from the downside nodes to upside nodes to represent the
route announcements between a pair of nodes with PP relationship.
3.3.1.2.3

Constructing dependency graph When all pair of neighboring ASs

have the PC relationship or the PP relationship, we have the dependency of their
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(a) p is a provider of c.

(b) Dependency among p, p0 , c and c0 .

Figure 3.3: Dependency graph for two ASs with PC relationship.

variables. After that, we can compose all those dependencies into the dependency
graph of the biNode model for all nodes. Then, we can derive the dependency graph
for all pairs of neighboring ASs that follow Gao-Rexford guideline. For example,
Figure 3.5 illustrates the dependency graph for an AS-level topology which contains
both PC relationship and PP relationship.
3.3.1.3

Deriving constraints from dependency graph

Given the dependency graph, we can generate the SMT constraints of the biNode
model. More specifically, the import policies are as follows.

i
besti = fselection ({fimport
(rj,i )|j ∈ Incoming(i)})

(3.4)

where Incoming(i) is the set of nodes that have a directed edge to node i in the
dependency graph. Note, the function fselection is the same as the topology-based
model, since it is determined by the BGP route selection process.
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(b) Dependency among x, x0 , y and y 0 .

(a) x is a peer of y.

Figure 3.4: Dependency graph for two ASs with PP relationship.

Accordingly, the constraints derived from export policies for the route announcement, ri,j , in the dependency graph are as follows.

ri,j =




best

if i == j 0

i

(3.5)



i,j
fexport
(besti )

Otherwise

If ri,j does not exist in the dependency graph, then ri,j = null. In a dependency
graph of the biNode model, only one variable of ri,j , ri,j 0 , ri0 ,j and ri0 ,j 0 exist between
variables of AS i and AS j.

3.3.2

Correctness of the BiNode Model

If the best path derived from the biNode model is the same as that from the
topology-based model, then we say that the biNode model is correct.
Theorem 3.3.1. The biNode model constructed under routing policies following GaoRexford guideline is correct.
Proof. We use superscript t to indicate a variable in the topology-based model and
superscript b to indicate a variable in the biNode model. The theorem can be proved
if the following two properties hold.
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(a) A topology with relations.

(b) Dependency graph of (a).

Figure 3.5: Dependency graph for a topology with both PC and PP relationships.

• Given a satisfiable assignment for variables of the topology-based model, there
is a satisfiable assignment for variables of the biNode model, where for any AS
i, bestti = bestbi .
• Given a satisfiable assignment for the biNode model, there is a satisfiable assignment for variables of the biNode model, where for any AS i, bestti = bestbi .
In the following, we show that these two properties hold respectively.
Given a satisfiable assignment of the topology-based model, we can construct a
satisfiable assignment for the biNode model as follows. We first derive the variables
of the best routes in the biNode model from that of the topology-based model.

bestbi = bestti
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(3.6)

bestbi0

=




bestt

if bestti is a customer route



Equation (3.4)

Otherwise

i

(3.7)

Now, we derive the variables of the announced routes in the biNode model. In the
b
b
b
b
biNode model, only one variable of ri,j
, ri,j
0 , ri0 ,j and ri0 ,j 0 , is in the dependency graph
b
to denote
and represents the route announcement from AS i to AS j. We use Ri,j

that variable.
b
t
Ri,j
= ri,j

(3.8)

In the following, we show that the derived assignment for biNode model is a satisfiable
assignment.
We first consider that the assignment for the biNode model satisfies the constraints
of import policy, Equation 3.4.
t
b
• If bestti is a customer route derived from rj,i
, then bestbi = bestbi0 and Rj,i
is
b
the incoming edge of the downside node of AS i. bestbi0 and Rj,i
satisfy the
b
is the most preferred customer route of
constraints of import policy, since Rj,i

AS i. Following the same reason, bestbi satisfies the constraints of import policy.
t
• If bestti is a peer route or a provider route derived from rj,i
, then AS i does not
b
receive any customer route and Rj,i
is the incoming edge of the upside node of
b
AS i. Apparently, bestbi0 satisfies the constraints of import policy. bestbi and Rj,i
b
satisfy the constraints of import policy, since Rj,i
is the most preferred route of

AS i.
Then, given a pair of neighboring ASs, i and j, we show that the variables of AS
i and j satisfy the constraints of the export policy, Equation 3.5.
b
• If AS i announces only customer routes to AS j, then Ri,j
is the outgoing edge
b
of the downside node of AS i and Ri,j
and bestbi0 satisfy Equation 3.5.
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b
b
• Otherwise, Ri,j
is the outgoing edge of the upside node of AS i and Ri,j
and

bestbi satisfy Equation 3.5.
Similarly, we can derive a satisfiable assignment for variables in a topology-based
model from that in a biNode model as follows.

bestti = bestbi

t
b
ri,j
= Ri,j

(3.9)

(3.10)

Apparently, bestti and the variables of the route announcements received by AS i satisfy the constraints of import policy, Equation 3.2, since bestbi is the best route among
all route announcements received by AS i. Then, we show that the assignment for
the topology-based model satisfies the constraints of the export policy, Equation 3.3.
i,j
t
= fexport
Given a pair of neighboring ASs, i and j, we show that ri,j
(bestti ) as

follows.
b
• If Ri,j
is the outgoing edge of node i0 , then AS i announces only customer
i,j
b
= fexport
(bestbi0 ). In that case, AS i announces only
routes to AS j and Ri,j

customer routes to AS j. If bestbi0 is a customer route, then bestbi0 = bestbi and
i,j
i,j
i,j
t
t
ri,j
= fexport
(bestbi0 ) = fexport
(bestti ). Otherwise, ri,j
= null = fexport
(bestti ).
b
• If Ri,j
is the outgoing edge of node i, then AS i can announce peer routes or
i,j
i,j
t
b
provider routes to AS j and ri,j
= Ri,j
= fexport
(bestbi ) = fexport
(bestti ).

3.4

BiNode Model for Any Policy

Routing policies of ASs might not follow Gao-Rexford guideline [35, 6, 67, 75]. In
this section, we consider how to build the policy-aware model when routing policies
of some ASs do not follow Gao-Rexford guideline. When a pair of neighboring ASs
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both follow Gao-Rexford guideline, we can generate the model based on the scheme in
Section 3.3. In the following, we illustrate how to generate constraints for the routing
policies of ASs that do not follow Gao-Rexford guideline.

3.4.1

Model Construction for Any Policy

We still use two nodes in the dependency graph of the biNode model to represent
each node in the dependency graph of the topology-based model. According to the
routing policy between each pair of neighboring ASs, we can derive the dependency
between them. Given the dependency, the constraints can be generated by following
Equation 3.4 and Equation 3.5.
For a pair of neighboring ASs with the routing policy in accordance with GaoRexford guideline, we illustrate the dependency in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. In the
following, we discuss how to derive the dependency graph for the ASs that do not
follow Gao-Rexford guideline.

3.4.1.1

Preferring peer routes over customer routes

An AS can also prefer the route from a peer over its customer routes. We refer to
the peer as preferred peer of the AS. Figure 3.6 illustrates a pair of nodes, where y is
a preferred peer of x and the according dependency for x, x0 , y and y 0 . Comparing
with the dependency graph in Figure 3.4, ry0 ,x is replaced by ry0 ,x0 which represents
that the route announcements from the preferred peer are preferred over its customer
routes.

3.4.1.2

Preferring provider routes over customer routes

An AS might prefer the route from a provider over its customer routes. We refer
to the provider as preferred provider of the AS. Figure 3.7 illustrates a pair of nodes,
where p is a preferred provider of c and the according dependency for p, p0 , c and c0 .
Comparing with the dependency graph in Figure 3.3, rp,c is replaced by rp,c0 which
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(a) y is a preferred peer of x.

(b) Dependency among x, x0 , y and y 0 .

Figure 3.6: Dependency graph for a node and its preferred peer.

represents that the route announcements from the preferred provider are preferred
over its customer routes.

3.4.1.3

Exporting peer and provider routes to peers

An AS might announce peer and provider routes to its peers. Figure 3.8 illustrates
two ASs, x and y, with PP relationship, where x announces peer and provider routes
to y and the according dependency among x, x0 , y and y 0 . Comparing with the dependency graph in Figure 3.4, the directed edge representing the route announcement
from a peer starts from the upside node, x, instead of the downside node, x0 . We use
rx,y to represent the route announcement from x to y, since bestx reflects the peer
and provider routes of x.

3.4.1.4

Exporting peer and provider routes to providers

An AS might announce peer and provider routes to its providers. Figure 3.9
illustrates two ASs, p and c, with PC relationship, where the customer, c, announces
peer and provider routes to its provider, y and the according dependency among p, p0 ,
c and c0 . Comparing with the dependency graph in Figure 3.3, the edge representing
the route announcement from a customer starts from the upside node instead of the
downside node. The reason is that the upside node reflects the peer and provider
routes.
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(a) p is a preferred provider of c.

(b) Dependency among p, p0 , c and c0 .

Figure 3.7: Dependency graph for a node and its preferred provider.

3.4.2

Correctness of the biNode model

The biNode model derived from routing policies beyond Gao-Rexford guideline is
also correct.
Theorem 3.4.1. The biNode model is correct.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3.1, we can prove Theorem 3.4.1 through
assignment construction. That is, given any satisfiable assignment for variables of the
topology-based model, we can construct a satisfiable assignment for variables of the
biNode model, where bestti = bestbi . In addition, given any satisfiable assignment for
variables of the biNode model, we can construct a satisfiable assignment for variables
of the topology-based model.
Given the satisfiable assignment for variables of the topology-based model, we can
derive a satisfiable assignment for variables of the biNode model through Equation 3.6,
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(b) Dependency among x, x0 , y and y 0 .

(a) x announces a peer or provider routes to
its peer y.

Figure 3.8: The dependency graph for a node and its peer to which the node announces its peer or provider routes.

Equation 3.7 and Equation 3.8. In the following, we show that the derived assignment
for biNode model is a satisfiable assignment.
We first consider that the assignment for the biNode model satisfies the constraints
of import policy, Equation 3.4.
• If bestti is a route from a customer, a preferred peer or a preferred provider,
b
t
saying AS j, then bestbi = bestbi0 and Rj,i
= rj,i
is the incoming edge of the
b
satisfy the constraints of import policy,
downside node of AS i. bestbi0 and Rj,i
b
is the most preferred route of AS i. Following the same reason, bestbi
since Rj,i

satisfies the constraints of import policy.
b
• Otherwise, Rj,i
is the incoming edge of the upside node of AS i. Apparently,
b
bestbi0 satisfies the constraints of import policy. bestbi and Rj,i
satisfy the conb
straints of import policy, since Rj,i
is the most preferred route of AS i.

Then, given a pair of neighboring ASs, i and j, we show that the variables of AS
i and j satisfy the constraints of the export policy, Equation 3.5.
b
• If AS i announces only customer routes to AS j, then Ri,j
is the outgoing edge
b
of the downside node of AS i and Ri,j
and bestbi0 satisfy Equation 3.5.
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(b) Dependency among p, p0 , c and c0 .

(a) c announces a peer or provider routes to
its provider p.

Figure 3.9: The dependency graph for a node and its provider to which the node
announces its peer or provider routes.

b
b
• Otherwise, Ri,j
is the outgoing edge of the upside node of AS i and Ri,j
and

bestbi satisfy Equation 3.5.
Similarly, given the satisfiable assignment for variables of the biNode model, we
can derive a satisfiable assignment for variables of the topology-based model through
Equation 3.9 and Equation 3.10. In the following, we show that the derived assignment for the topology-based model is a satisfiable assignment.
Apparently, bestti = bestbi and the variables of the route announcements received
by AS i satisfy the constraints of import policy, Equation 3.2, since bestbi is the
best route among all route announcements received by AS i. Then, we show that
the assignment for the topology-based model satisfies the constraints of the export
policy, Equation 3.3.
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i,j
t
Given a pair of neighboring ASs, i and j, we show that ri,j
= fexport
(bestti ) as

follows.
b
• If Ri,j
is the outgoing edge of node i0 , then AS i announces only customer
i,j
b
= fexport
(bestbi0 ). In that case, AS i announces only
routes to AS j and Ri,j

customer routes to AS j. If bestbi0 is a customer route, then bestbi0 = bestbi and
i,j
i,j
i,j
t
t
ri,j
= fexport
(bestbi0 ) = fexport
(bestti ). Otherwise, ri,j
= null = fexport
(bestti ).
b
• If Ri,j
is the outgoing edge of node i, then AS i can announce peer routes or
i,j
i,j
t
b
provider routes to AS j and ri,j
= Ri,j
= fexport
(bestbi ) = fexport
(bestti ).

3.5

Query Specification

Given routing policies, the verifier can model the policies and perform a collection
of verification queries for the policies. In the following, we use a few verification
queries as examples to illustrate the capability of the verifier.
3.5.1

Detecting Potential Hijacking Attack

The inter-domain routing system is notoriously vulnerable to hijacking attacks [10,
40, 38]. In a hijacking attack, an attacker AS announces a prefix belonging to another
AS in the hope to attract traffic so as to eavesdrop, intercept or blackhole the traffic.
Hijacking is an on-going activities and have been observed through a series of analysis
and/or monitoring methods [78, 90, 48, 107]. Therefore, it is critical for an AS to
realize its vulnerability to hijacking attacks. Before committing to a routing policy,
an AS might want to check whether a policy will lead it more vulnerable to hijacking
attacks by an attacker. For example, an AS within U.S. might want to make sure its
traffic to Google will not be hijacked by an AS from a particular country.
To illustrate the query specification, we consider the scenario where AS I wants
to ensure its traffic to a destination, D, will not be hijacked by an attacker, AS A.
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The verification query is whether the attacker, AS A, can hijack the traffic from AS I
to a destination by manipulating its export policy. That is, AS A might export fake
routes to its neighbors. We assume that the routing policy of the attacker does not
lead to route oscillation, since that is not the goal of the attacker. To detect potential
hijacking attack, network operators can use the following query.

Q ⇐⇒ ∃PA , PA ∧ W aypoint(I, A) ∧ Origin(D)
where, PA is the policy of AS A, D is the destination AS, and W aypoint(I, A)
means that the best route of AS I goes through AS A. To represent the logic of
W aypoint(I, A) by SMT constraints, we add a binary variable, f lagA , to each route
in the model. If r.f lagA is T rue, the route r goes through the AS A. Then, we can
represent the waypoint property as follows.

W aypoint(I, A) ⇐⇒ rI .f lagA ∧ rI .valid
If the SMT solver gets a satisfiable assignment, AS A can manipulate its routing
policy to attract the traffic from AS I.
3.5.2

Inbound Traffic Engineering

As the Internet evolved, it becomes a meshed network [59, 18, 4, 33, 56], where
networks directly interconnect with each other through dedicated links or Internet
Exchange Points (IXP). As a result, an AS might be accessed by the rest of the
Internet through multiple neighbors of the AS. The network operators can perform
the inbound traffic engineering to select the neighbor from which the traffic comes.
For example, the network operators might want to select one of the providers for the
inbound traffic from a specific network, such as Google.
The verifier can help the network operators to set up their routing policies for the
inbound traffic engineering. The network operators might want to know whether they
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can achieve the purpose if they only change the routing policy of their own network.
To specify the query, we can also use the waypoint property. Namely, the best route
of the specific source network goes through a selected neighbor of the destination.
The query can be represented as follow.

Q ⇐⇒ ∃PD , PD ∧ W aypoint(I, A) ∧ Origin(D)

where, I is the source network, D is the destination AS and A is the selected neighbor
of D for the traffic from I to D. If the SMT solver gets a satisfiable assignment, the
network operators can reach the inbound traffic engineering goal through adjusting
their own routing policies only.

3.5.3

Impact of AS De-Peering

Settlement-free connections are established between a pair of ASs to distribute
traffic for their respective customer networks. In contrast, a pair of peering ASs
might decide to terminate the settlement-free connections due to the reasons, such
as unbalance traffic volume. This operation is known as De-Peering. Although, depeering is not common, it might cause significant impact on the Internet. Especially,
when de-peering is over two Tier-1 ASs, it might break the connectivity between their
respective customers [100].
Given a de-peering between two neighboring ASs, the verifier can be used to
explore its impact. More specifically, it can verify whether some ASs can not reach a
destination due to the de-peering. We have the following query.

Q ⇐⇒ ∃I, ¬rI .valid ∧ Disconnect(A, B) ∧ Origin(D)

where, A and B are the two ASs that de-peer with each other and D is the destination.
A,B
B,A
To represent Disconnect(A, B) in SMT constraints, we set fexport
and fexport
to return
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the invalid route, rempty . If the SMT solver returns SAT , AS D can not be reached
by at least one AS due to the de-peering.

3.6

Query Optimizations

In this section, we first analyze the size of policy-aware models to illustrate the
difficulty of the verification on the Internet topology. Then, we propose a queryspecific pruning method to reduce variables in policy-aware models.

3.6.1

Policy-aware Model Size

Although policy-aware models in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 can accelerate the
SMT solving process, it leads to a large number of variables. For the same BGP
system, the policy-aware models need more variables than the topology-based model.
Given a topology with N nodes and M edges, the number of variables in the policyaware model is O((2 ∗ N + 4 ∗ M ) ∗ Vroute ), where Vroute is the number of variables
that represent a single route or route announcement.
Based on the Internet measurement, there are more than 60, 000 ASs and 300, 000
links between ASs [13]. As a result, to model the entire Internet topology, if we treat
each AS as one router/node, millions of variables are necessary in the policy-aware
models. In the following, we propose a pruning method to reduce the number of
variables in the policy-aware models.

3.6.2

Model Pruning

We can prune policy-aware models through removing variables irrelevant to the
query result. For a specific verification query, variables can be removed due to two
facts. Firstly, a verification query is usually associated with a small set of routes
which depend only on a subset of records in the models. The other records can be
removed from the model. Secondly, according to the construction of the policy-aware
models in Section 3.3.1 and Section 3.4.1, some records are always null. These records
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do not impact the assignment of the other records. On one hand, in a policy-aware
model, if a route is null, the associated route announcements depending on the route
is null. On the other hand, if a route announcement is null, the route announcement
will not be selected as a best route. Therefore, the records that are always null can
be removed from the model.
Given the query, we can construct the dependency graph of the policy-aware model
and identify those irrelevant records. To identify the irrelevant records, we perform
both forward and backward graph traversals on the dependency graph.
3.6.2.0.1

Backward Traversal We refer to a route that is regulated in the prop-

erties of a verification query as a target route. We traverse the dependency graph
starting from a target route in reverse direction and mark all visited nodes as routes
that are depended by the target route. The unvisited records do not impact the
assignment for the target route.
3.6.2.0.2

Forward Traversal We refer to an AS as an origin AS for a prefix if

the AS originates a route of the prefix without needing a route announcements from
its neighbors. We traverse the dependency graph from the downside node of an origin
AS and mark all visited nodes as routes that depend on the origin AS. The unvisited
records should be null.
A record is kept in the model if the record is visited both in the backward traversal
and the forward traversal. The other records are removed. A query might be related
to multiple target routes. For example, operators might want to ensure that all
routers will have valid routes to a destination. That is, we might also perform multiple
backward traversals in the second step. In a verification query, there might be multiple
origin ASs. For example, a hijacking attacker might be an origin AS in the verification.
That is, there are multiple forward traversals in the first step. The time complexity
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of the pruning algorithm is O((No + Nt ) ∗ M ), where No is the number of origin ASs,
Nt is the number of target routes and M is the number of edges in the graph.

3.7

Evaluation

We implement verification toolkits and evaluate the biNode model. We introduce
the input dataset for the verification system in Section 3.7.2. In section 3.7.3, we
compare the performance of the biNode model and the topology-based model on a
set of topologies with modest size. In Section 3.7.4 we verify queries on the Internet
topologies to show that the biNode model can verify queries at Internet scale. Finally,
we show the effect of model pruning in Section 3.7.5.

3.7.1

Implementation

We implement the prototype of the verification system which includes both the
topology-based model and the biNode model. The verification system takes as input
the network topology with routing policies and the query. To perform the verification,
the verification system will encode the query into a SMT problem which is fed into a
SMT solver to get the verification result. We use Z3 [17] as the SMT solver to solve
the SMT problem.

3.7.2

Experiment Setting

To evaluate the topology-based model and the biNode model for network verification, we use the Internet AS-level topologies in CAIDA AS Relationship Database [13]
and generate routing policies based on the relationship. To generate a set of topologies with modest size for model comparison, we extract ASs and the associated links
from the real topology. To guarantee that the extracted topology is connected, we
select ASs through random walk starting from an origin AS and all links between any
pair of visited ASs.
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(a) Prefix-hijacking queries.

(b) Inbound traffic engineering queries.

(c) Reachability queries.

Figure 3.10: Comparison among the verification time of topology-based model (TB),
the biNode (BN) model and the biNode model with pruning (BN trim) for routing
policies following Gao-Rexford guideline.

73

Figure 3.11: Prefix-hijacking queries on topologies with routing policies beyond GaoRexford guideline.

We generate routing policies following Gao-Rexford guideline and beyond GaoRexford guideline. The majority of ASs have routing policies following Gao-Rexford
guideline. Accordingly to the survey [35], about 30% ASs might violate GR Preference
rule or GR Export rule. We generate routing policies with different levels of violation:
low violation (LV ), moderate violation (MV ) and high violation (HV ), where 10%,
20% and 30% ASs violate both GR export rules and GR preference rules respectively.
We test the verification system through a set of queries on topologies of various
sizes. We test the verification system on a server with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5607
2.27GHz CPU and 16GB memory.

3.7.3

Comparison between the BiNode Model and the Topology-based
Model

We compare the verification time of the topology-based model and the biNode
model through three types of queries: prefix-hijacking query, inbound traffic engineering query and reachability query. We perform these queries on the topologies of
various sizes. For each topology, we randomly generate 10 queries of the same type
and measure the average running time for the comparison.
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Figure 3.12: Inbound traffic engineering queries on topologies with routing policies
beyond Gao-Rexford guideline.

Figure 3.13: Reachability queries on topologies with routing policies beyond GaoRexford guideline.
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3.7.3.1

Verifying Routing Policies under Gao-Rexford Guideline

In Figure 3.10, we show the running time of the topology-based model and the
biNode model for verifying routing policies under Gao-Rexford guideline and 99%
confidence intervals for the running time. For all three kinds of queries, the biNode
model performs better than the topology-based model when the topology containing
hundreds of ASs.
When pruning optimization is used, the biNode model can speed the verification
by more than 100x for prefix-hijacking queries and inbound traffic engineering queries
at topologies of modest sizes. For the reachability query, the speedup is only 6x.
The reason is that in the query, the property regulates the best routes of all nodes.
Therefore, there are not a lot of irrelevant variables that can be pruned.
As Figure 3.10 shows, the speedups for all queries increase with the topology
size. It indicates that the biNode model with pruning optimization has much better
scalability.

3.7.3.2

Verifying Routing Policies beyond Gao-Rexford Guideline

We also compare the performance of the topology-based model and the biNode model for routing policies beyond Gao-Rexford guideline. Figure 3.11, Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 show the average running time with 99% confidence level of
prefix-hijacking queries, inbound traffic engineering queries and reachability queries
on topologies with routing policies beyond Gao-Rexford guideline. As Figure 3.11
and Figure 3.12 show, the biNode model with pruning is also 100x faster than the
topology-based model at a modest topology size when the routing policies are beyond Gao-Rexford guideline. As Figure 3.13 shows, the biNode model with pruning
is around 10x faster than the topology-based model at a modest topology size when
the routing policies are beyond Gao-Rexford guideline. According to the result in Figure 3.11, Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13, routing policies with reasonable violations (low
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Figure 3.14: Running time of the biNode model with pruning for queries on Internetscale topologies with 99% confidence level.

Table 3.2: Effect of model pruning (for inbound traffic engineering queries) in the
biNode model.
Year
2003
2008
2013
2018

# of ASs
15,320
28,411
44,326
60,874

# of edges
34,720
78,997
149,476
300,634

PR (90% confidence level)
547.2 ± 53.2
1913.3 ± 1541.2
4910.8 ± 1105.5
2845.7 ± 1024.1

level, moderate level and high level) to Gao-Rexford guideline do not significantly
impact the performance of the biNode model.

3.7.4

Scalability of the BiNode Model

We illustrate the scalability of the biNode model on the Internet-scale topologies.
Figure 3.14 illustrates the average running time for answering prefix-hijacking and
inbound traffic engineering queries on the Internet topologies from Year 2003 to Year
2018 with five-year intervals. As shown in Figure 3.14, even for queries on the Internetscale topology, the verification system can answer the queries within two minutes.

3.7.5

Effect of Model Pruning

Pruning optimization on the biNode model can significantly reduce the variables
in the model. To measure the variable reduction, we define pruning ratio (PR), as
the ratio of variable number in the biNode model without pruning to variable number
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after pruning. To evaluate the pruning optimization, we measure PR for queries on
the Internet topologies. Table 3.2 illustrates the size of Internet topologies from Year
2003 to Year 2018 with five-year intervals and the PR with 90% confidence level. We
randomly select 100 inbound traffic engineering queries for each topology and list the
average PR in Table 3.2. As shown in Table 3.2, pruning optimization can achieve
very high PR and significantly improve the verification performance.

3.8

Related Work

To detect and prevent network errors, many tools have been developed to analyze
and verify a network, such as a data-center network and an Internet Service Providers
(ISP). Those network-wide verification tools are typically applied within a single
network. Alternatively, to analyze and verify properties of the Internet, researchers
also propose a lot of mechanisms for Internet-wide network verification.

3.8.1

Network-wide Verification

A series of network verification techniques [11, 98, 27, 32, 2, 86, 104, 73, 106, 49,
51, 91] have been proposed for verification at network-wide. A class of tools [27, 32,
49, 51, 91] aim to analyze and verify the reachability on the current snapshot of a data
plane. The snapshot of the data plane only reflects the routing behavior of the network under the current link-failure scenario and the current external announcements.
Alternatively, control plane verification tools [11, 98, 2, 86, 104, 73, 106] enlarge the
data plane coverage through generating many or all data planes from the control
plane. As a result, it is costly to enumerate all possible data planes for network
verification. To accelerate the verification, Beckett et al. [12] propose a compressed
model for a broad range of routing protocols to preserve general path properties, such
as reachability, loop freedom and absence of black holes. These proposed models can
typically handle up to thousands of routers at most.
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3.8.2

Internet-wide Network Verification

A number of formal methods have been exploited to verify properties at the Internet scale. To study the safety property of BGP systems, Satisfiable Module Theories
(SMT) [93] and Rewriting Logic [95] are used to verify the convergence conditions. A
model checking tool is used to search possible attraction attacks on the Internet [85].
The computational complexity of devising a hijacking strategy in different policybased routing protocols is analyzed in [16]. Both work assume that Gao-Rexford
guideline is followed by all ASs. We propose a general model for control plane verification. The biNode model can verify a board range of routing properties, such as
prefix-hijacking queries and inbound traffic engineering queries, for routing policies
beyond Gao-Rexford guideline.
Wang et al. [92, 94] propose a network compression method for policy-based routing to accelerate the analysis of convergence behavior through preserving safety property. The method reduce the model size through exploiting the duplicate router configuration and the symmetry in the topologies. In contrast, the biNode model exploits
the intrinsic hierarchy in the routing policy and reflects the hierarchy explicitly in the
model to accelerate the formal method.

3.9

Conclusion

In this chapter, we propose the biNode model to verify the policy-based routing
through characterizing the verification problem into a SMT problem. Through analyzing the intrinsic hierarchy of the routing policy, we can reflect the hierarchy in
the constraints to accelerate the SMT solving process. Further, we prune the biNode
model through removing irrelevant variables. We implement the network verification
toolkits which include the biNode model and the topology-based model, and evaluate
these models. The experimental results show that the biNode model can reduce the
time it takes to perform verification by as much as 100x even under a modest topology
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size. It takes only a few minutes to answer a query for a topology containing tens of
thousands of nodes.
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CHAPTER 4
PATH-PRESERVING ANONYMIZATION FOR
INTER-DOMAIN ROUTING POLICIES

4.1

Introduction

The Internet consists of tens of thousands of autonomous systems (ASes), each
of which belongs to an organization such as an Internet Service Provider (ISP), a
university, a company, or an Internet Exchange Point (IXP). The interconnections
in the Internet have a hierarchical structure, where tier-1 ISPs provide settlementfree services among each other, and provide transit services to regional ISPs or stub
networks, and regional ISPs provide transit services to even smaller ISPs or stub
networks. BGP is a policy-based protocol used for routing among ASes.
The route taken by a packet to traverse in the Internet is determined by the route
selection process, and a result of complex interactions controlled by the configured
routing policies of all networks. Knowing routing policies of all networks allow us to
answer a broad set of what-if questions [98, 79]. For example, if a network wants the
inbound traffic from Google to go through a specific provider, then before changing
its routing configuration the operator wants to verify that the configuration indeed
leads to the desired outcome.
Routing policies are considered to be proprietary by their networks. Each network
administrator/operator configures its routing policy independently. The routing policy of a network reveals how the network exchanges routes with neighbors. Thus,
the commercial agreement (e.g., provider-customer relationships) between neighboring ASes can be inferred through their routing policies. Further, the routing policy
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of a network reveals that which neighbor is more preferred than others. Therefore,
routing policies should be anonymized before sharing.
A trivial method of anonymizing routing policies is to anonymize IDs of all networks, e.g. AS Numbers, in the routing policies. Namely, each original AS Number
is transformed into a unique ID. However, anonymizing IDs alone is not sufficient.
The number of neighbors of a network can be inferred from the anonymized routing
policy of the network, even if all network IDs contained in the routing policy are
anonymized.
In the Internet, tier-1 ISPs have a large number of neighbors (customers and peers)
and the number of neighbors follow power-law distribution [80]. The ASes with a large
number of neighbors are few and their degrees (e.g. the number of neighbors) are
usually unique. The AS-level topology can be derived from the publicly available
routing tables of RouteViews [71] and RIPE RIS [1]. The degrees in the AS-level
topology can be used to identify the AS. Even if the derived AS-level topology does
not exactly reflect the AS-level topology in reality, the ranking of these large ISPs
in terms of degree will be same. Thus, these Tier-1 ISPs can still be identified.
Identifying a few tier-1 networks can lead to identifying tier-2 networks by what tier1 neighbors they have. Progressively, more and more ASes might be identified when
their higher-tier neighbors have been identified. Therefore, anonymizing the AS-level
topology is the key in anonymizing routing policies.
Anonymizing graphs have been studied at the area of online social networks [61,
108, 109, 15, 76, 74, 23, 97, 101]. These schemes perturb the graph through adding
and/or removing nodes and/or edges in social networks, so that the adversaries can
not identify users from the social network. These schemes focus on preserving social
network structural properties. However, these schemes do not maintain the best
paths derived from the routing policies. The applications exploiting the inter-domain
routing policy are very sensitive to the best paths derived from the routing policy.
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Therefore, these schemes can not be directly applied to the anonymization of routing
policies.
In this chapter, we propose a path-preserving anonymization scheme for sharing
inter-domain routing policies. We anonymize the routing policies so that the best
paths can be maintained after anonymization. To do that, we first perturb AS-level
topology by adding fake networks and connection between fake networks and between
fake and real networks. We then establish routing policies for these newly-added links.
To perturb the AS-level topology, one anonymization scheme is adding neighborhood relationships between pairs of networks. However, simply adding fake edges
between networks is not sufficient to maintain the best path utility. The reason is
that the local preferences on the fake edge between two networks can not be properly
assigned. When network u is connected to network v through a fake edge, to avoid
the fake edge being included in the best paths, all real edges should be preferred over
the fake edge. Thus, network u and network v should give each other the lowest local
preference. In practice, a network assigns the lowest local preference to its provider
and a pair of neighboring ASes can not be the provider of each other. Therefore, the
fake edges between a pair of ASes, such as network u and network v, can be identified
by using the local preferences assigned to the fake edge.
We propose to add fake networks into the AS-level topology and then add the connection between fake networks and real networks to perturb the AS-level topology.
In the topology perturbation, we first consider to avoid being identified through the
number of neighbors. We propose a deterministic anonymization scheme which derives a k-anonymity graph. As a result, the probability of identifying a network by the
degree information is at most k1 . However, the resulting k-anonymity graph is deterministic. We further propose the probabilistic anonymization scheme to generate the
k-anonymity graph with higher randomness. To anonymize the AS-level topology,
the probabilistic anonymization scheme might significantly enlarge the graph with
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fake networks. Adding too many fake networks might make the scheme infeasible in
practice. Finally, we propose the hybrid anonymization scheme to take advantage of
the strengths of both the deterministic anonymization scheme and the probabilistic
anonymization scheme.
After fake networks and fake edges are added, we propose to generate the associated routing policies for those fake networks and edges. To avoid de-anonymization,
in the anonymized routing policies, the local preferences assigned to real neighboring
ASes and fake neighboring ASes have the same distribution.
We evaluate the proposed anonymization schemes against de-anonymization attacks exploiting rich structural information, such as neighborhood and reference distance. The experimental result shows that the structure-based de-anonymization
attacks can identify less than 1% networks from the anonymized AS-level topology.
In addition, we use Closeness Centrality as an example metrics to illustrate how hard
to identify a network through the structural information. We also show that the
forged routing policies of networks added by the anonymization schemes will not be
used to identify the added networks from the original networks.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follow: In Section 4.2, we illustrate background and formally define the problem. In Section 4.3, we discuss the preliminaries
necessary for preserving utility to construct the anonymization schemes. To perturb the AS-level topology, in Section 4.4 we propose the deterministic anonymization scheme, the probabilistic anonymization scheme and the hybrid anonymization
scheme respectively. In Section 4.5, we propose to perturb the routing policies through
a local preference assignment scheme. We describe the experiment in Section 4.6, related work in Section 4.7, and make the conclusion of the chapter in Section 4.8.

4.2

Background and Problem Formulation

In this section, we formulate the problem to be addressed.
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4.2.1

Routing Policies and AS-level Topology

BGP is the de-facto standard for inter-domain routing in the Internet. BGP
allows network operators to configure the routing policy of their own networks. The
routing policies of those networks together determine the best routes from source to
destination networks. In BGP, a network assigns a local preference to each of its
neighbors respectively and prefers the routes from a neighbor network with a larger
local preference.
Listing 4.1: A snippet of the routing policy
r o u t e r bgp 45000
n e i g h b o r 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 2 remote−as 40000
n e i g h b o r 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 2 r o u t e −map SET−LOCAL−PREF−CUST i n
n e i g h b o r 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 3 remote−as 50000
n e i g h b o r 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 3 r o u t e −map SET−LOCAL−PREF−PEER i n
!
r o u t e −map SET−LOCAL−PREF−CUST
s e t l o c a l −p r e f e r e n c e 200
r o u t e −map SET−LOCAL−PREF−PEER
s e t l o c a l −p r e f e r e n c e 100
In Listing 4.1, we illustrate a snippet of the routing policy for AS 45000. The
routing policy of AS 45000 indicates the neighborhood relationships of AS 45000.
According to the routing policy, AS 45000 has two neighboring ASes, AS 40000 and
AS 50000. This snippet also indicates that AS 45000 sets up the local preference 200
for its customer, AS 40000, and the local preference 100 for its peer, AS 50000. As a
result, AS 45000 prefers routes from AS 40000 over that from AS 50000.
The routing policy of a network indicates the neighboring ASes of the network.
The routing policies of all networks together implies the AS-level topology of the
Internet. Let us denote the AS-level topology by a graph, G = {V, E, R}, where V
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is the set of nodes, E is the set of edges and R is the set of all routing policies. Each
node represents an AS in the Internet. The edge between two nodes represents the
link between two networks.

4.2.2

Path-preserving Anonymization

To protect the routing policies, we can obfuscate the key information in the routing
policies. One of the most trivial one is pseudonymization. We can replace AS numbers
in the routing policies by a pseudo ID, so that the routing policies can not be identified
through the AS numbers directly. Let us denote the pseudonymization as a network
mapping function, π, that maps the original AS number to the anonymized AS number
(the pseudo ID).
Anonymizing IDs only is not enough for the anonymization of routing policies. The
neighboring relationship with the real preference and the real neighbor ID implied
by the routing policies can be used for identification as we state in the introduction.
Beyond pseudonymization, we might also change the neighboring ASes and local
preferences for these neighboring ASes in a routing policy. As for the routing policy
in Listing 4.1, we might switch the local preferences of AS 40000 and AS 50000.
However, the obfuscation might not preserve the best paths derived by the routing
policies. For example, after switching the local preferences in the routing policy of
Listing 4.1, AS 45000 prefers routes from AS 50000 over that from AS 40000.
Answering what-if questions by exploiting the inter-domain routing policy relies on
the best paths derived from the routing policies. If the best paths of the anonymized
routing policy is different from the best paths of the original routing policy, then the
anonymized routing policy might not be useful to answer what-if questions. In order
to preserve the utility of the routing policy, a best path derived by the original routing
policy should be a best path derived by the anonymized routing policy. We say that
the anonymization scheme preserves the best path utility, if, for an AS-level topology
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G = {V, E, R}, ∀i, j ∈ V , π(P ath(i, j)) = P ath(π(i), π(j)), where P ath(i, j) indicates
the best path from network i to network j and π(P ath(i, j)) maps all original AS
numbers of ASes in the best path to their anonymized AS numbers.
In this chapter, we propose the anonymization schemes that preserve the best
path utility. To do so, all networks and the neighboring relationships are maintained
after the routing policy anonymization. Namely, the anonymization schemes should
not remove nodes or edges from the AS-level topology. Instead, the anonymization
schemes can add new nodes and new edges into the AS-level topology. In addition,
the local preferences of neighboring ASes can be changed but the ranking of these
local preferences should be maintained. Thus, after the anonymization, a network
ranks the neighboring ASes in the same way as before the anonymization.

4.2.3

Threat Model

After the anonymization, the routing policies of all networks are publicly available.
The adversary can access the anonymized routing policies of all networks and try to
figure out the routing policy for each network. Given an AS number, the adversary
needs to identify the routing policy of this AS and discovers how this AS ranks its
neighboring ASes from the routing policy. To preserve the best path utility, how
an AS ranks its neighboring ASes is maintained in the anonymized routing policy.
Therefore, the key of this de-anonymization procedure is to infer the network mapping
function, π.
The AS-level topology implied by the anonymized routing policies can be used to
identify the routing policy of each network. The routing tables of RouteViews [71]
and RIPE RIS [1] are publicly available. The adversary can get the AS-level topology
of the Internet by using the routing tables. To preserve the best path utility, all
networks and their connections are maintained in the anonymized AS-level topology.
We consider that the adversary tries to use the AS-level topology of the Internet to
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identify the networks in the anonymized AS-level topology and figure out the routing
policy of the networks.

4.3

Anonymization Scheme Overview

To anonymize the routing policies, we first consider how to perturb the AS-level
topology implied by the routing policies, so that the networks are hard to be identified
through the number of neighbors. Then, we modify the routing policies of these
networks accordingly, so that the networks are hard to be identified through the local
preferences in the anonymized routing policies.

4.3.1

Anonymizing Graph Structure

To perturb the AS-level topology, we consider to generate k-anonymity graphs. A
k-anonymity graph is a graph that, for any node, there are at least k − 1 other nodes
sharing the same degree with the node. If only the degree information is used by the
adversary, the probability that the adversary can correctly identify a real node from
the k-anonymity graph is at most k1 .
An anonymized graph that is not k-anonymity can also guarantee that the adversary can not correctly identify a real node with the probability higher than

1
.
k

Following this idea, we extend the definition of k-anonymity graph as follows. Given
an anonymized graph derived from the original graph, the anonymized graph is a
k-anonymity graph, if the probability that the adversary can correctly identify a real
node is no more than

1
k

when the original graph size goes to infinity. Formally, ∀u ∈ V

and ∀v ∈ V 0 ,
lim P P (π(u) = v|Y = y) ≤

|V |→∞

1
= 1,
k

(4.1)

where V and V 0 are the sets of nodes in the original graph and the anonymized graph
respectively and y is the degree sequence of nodes in the anonymized graph. In
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Section 4.4, we propose three graph anonymization schemes to generate k-anonymity
graph.
Although k-anonymity with a small k is vulnerable to de-anonymization attacks,
the proposed schemes can select a large k, such as k equals the number of real nodes.
The reason is that the proposed schemes preserve the best path utility. Selecting a
large k does not impact the utility of the anonymized graph. In the experiment, we
will show that selecting a large k can achieve pretty good anonymization performance.
To preserve the best path utility, all nodes and edges in the original graph should
be maintained in the anonymized graph. Therefore, the anonymization schemes
should not remove nodes or edges. We propose to add fake nodes into the graph.
Then, fake nodes and real nodes are connected by a set of fake edges to perturb the
graph structure.

4.3.2

Local Preference Assignment for Fake Edges

After the graph anonymization, we need to modify all routing policies for newlyadded nodes and edges. For each fake node added into the topology, we need to create
a new routing policy for the node. For each fake edge added into the topology, the
local preferences should be properly assigned to the edge. In Section 4.5, we propose
a local preference assignment scheme to determine local preferences for these fake
edges, so that the fake nodes can not be identified through their local preferences.

4.4

Node Anonymization

In this section, we propose three anonymization schemes to perturb the AS-level
topology. In Section 4.4.1, we first propose the deterministic anonymization scheme
which generates a k-anonymity graph. However, the resulting graph is determined
by the Internet topology and lacks of randomness. To increase the randomness of the
resulting graph, we propose the probabilistic anonymization scheme in Section 4.4.2.
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The probabilistic anonymization scheme might significantly enlarge the graph with
fake networks. Finally, in Section 4.4.3, we propose the hybrid anonymization scheme
that takes the advantages of both the deterministic and probabilistic anonymization
schemes.

4.4.1

Deterministic Anonymization Scheme

In the deterministic anonymization scheme, we partition all nodes of the original
graph into several groups, where each group contains at least k nodes. Then, we add
fake edges between these real nodes and fake nodes to make these real nodes in the
same group have the same degree. Finally, fake edges are added between fake nodes
to make all fake nodes have the same degree.

4.4.1.1

Node Grouping

Given a graph with n nodes, we partition all real nodes into b nk c groups, where
each group at least has k nodes. To do so, we sort the nodes of the original graph
in the descending order of their degrees. For the first b nk c − 1 group, the group i is
composed of the (i ∗ k − k + 1)-th node to the (i ∗ k)-th node. The last group is
composed of the (b nk c ∗ k − k + 1)-th node to the n-th node.
For each group, we select a target degree. All real nodes in the group are supposed
to reach the target degree of this group after the anonymization. To increase the
degree of real nodes, we add fake nodes and fake edges. We also select a target
degree for all fake nodes. When every node reaches their target degrees, we get a kanonymity graph. Please refer to Appendix B.1 for how we select the target degrees
and the number of fake nodes added into the anonymized graph.

4.4.1.2

Graph Construction

Given the number of fake nodes and the target degrees, we add fake edges to
generate k-anonymity graph. We define degree gap of a node as the target degree
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of this node minus its degree. We use gi to denote the degree gap of node i. The
degree of fake nodes in the original graph are zero. Through adding fake edges, we
will make the degree gaps of all nodes be zero. To do so, we select one node with the
largest degree gap and make the node reach its target degree in each step. We show
the details as follows.
4.4.1.2.1

Increasing real node degree To increase the degree of real nodes, we

always select the real node that has the largest degree gap. Suppose that we select
node i with the degree gap gi . Then, we select gi fake nodes that have the largest
degree gap and connect these gi fake nodes with node i with fake nodes.
4.4.1.2.2

Increasing fake node degree To increase the degree of fake nodes,

we always select the fake node that has the largest degree gap. Suppose that we select
node i with the degree gap gi . Then, besides node i, we select gi fake nodes that have
the largest degree gap and connect these gi fake nodes with node i with fake nodes.
4.4.1.3

Privacy Guarantee

Theorem 4.4.1. The deterministic anonymization scheme can generate a k-anonymity
graph.
Please refer to Appendix B.1 for the proof of this Theorem.

4.4.2

Probabilistic Anonymization Scheme

The deterministic scheme lacks of uncertainty. The regularity of the anonymized
graph generated by the deterministic scheme can be used for de-anonymization. In
order to increase the uncertainty of the anonymization scheme, we propose probabilistic anonymization scheme. In probabilistic scheme, we add randomness during
the graph anonymization so that the resulting graph is not deterministic.
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4.4.2.1

Graph Anonymization

The basic idea of the graph anonymization is to connect a real node and a fake
node with the probability, p. For each real node, the number of its fake neighbors is
a random variable that follows binomial distribution with the average as m ∗ p and
the variance as m ∗ p(1 − p). When the difference between the degrees of two real
nodes in the original graph is insignificant comparing to m ∗ p(1 − p), these two real
nodes can not be identified through their degrees.
Given a graph G, we refer to a group with k nodes in G as k-node group. In a
graph G, we define k-node degree delta of a k-node group as the difference between
the maximal and the minimal degrees of nodes in the group. Then, for a specific node,
there are a number of k-node groups that contain this node. We define minimal knode degree delta of a node as the minimal k-node degree delta of k-node groups that
contain the node. We use δ(i,k) to denote the minimal k-node degree delta of node i.
We refer to that k-node group as minimal k-node group of this node.
We construct the k-anonymity graph as follows.
4.4.2.1.1

2
Adding Fake Nodes We add m = max(δ(max,k)
ln n, n) fake nodes

into the graph, where δ(max,k) is the maximal δ(i,k) for ∀i ∈ [1, n], n is the number of
nodes in G and dmax is the maximal degree in the graph G. We will show that m is
sufficient in Theorem 4.4.2.
4.4.2.1.2

Connecting Real Nodes with Fake Nodes For each real node, we

add a fake edge between this real node and each fake node with a probability p, where
0 < p < 1. On average, each real node will connect to m ∗ p fake nodes.
4.4.2.1.3

Connecting Fake Nodes with Fake Nodes Then, we connect fake

nodes with fake nodes. The goal is to make the expected degree of fake nodes be
the expected degree of the real node with the highest degree in the original graph.
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To do that, each fake node connects to another fake node with the probability q =
(m−n)p+dmax
.
m−1

4.4.2.2

Probabilistic Privacy Guarantee

Theorem 4.4.2. The probabilistic scheme generates a k-anonymity graph.
We provide the proof of this Theorem in Appendix B.2. In the following, we
just illustrate the intuitive idea that the anonymization method can generate a kanonymity graph. In the anonymization procedure, a number of fake edges are added
to each real and fake node. With a higher probability (the probability goes to one
when the graph size goes to infinity), the k nodes in the minimal k-node group of each
node will have very similar degrees in the anonymized graph. Because, the minimal
k-node degree delta will be asymptotically smaller than the variance for the number
of the fake edges connected to each real node. Apparently, it is more likely that the
node with higher degree in original graph has the higher degree in the anonymized
graph. However, when the degree of a node in the anonymized graph is dominated by
the fake edges added in the anonymization procedure, the degree delta of the nodes
in the original graph are insignificant. Then, the k nodes in each group have similar
degrees. The probability of successfully identifying nodes by their degrees is 1/k.

4.4.3

Hybrid Anonymization Scheme

In the probabilistic anonymization scheme, the number of fake nodes needed to
perturb the graph rises rapidly with the increasing of the degree difference. Since
the degree of networks in AS-level topology follow the power-law distribution, the
degree difference between Tier-1 networks is large. Then, the number of fake nodes
for anonymization is asymptotically larger than the number of real nodes.
In order to reduce the number of added faked nodes, we propose the hybrid
anonymization scheme. We will first use the deterministic anonymization scheme
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to reduce the degree difference in the graph. After that we derive probabilistic kanonymity graph by using the probabilistic anonymization scheme.

4.4.3.1

Graph Construction

Hybrid anonymization scheme guarantees to generate a k-anonymity graph. The
key idea is to reduce the degree difference through the technique of the deterministic
anonymization scheme and then apply the probabilistic anonymization scheme. We
describe the two phases as follows.
4.4.3.1.1

Reducing Degree Delta through Deterministic Anonymization

Scheme Given a graph with n nodes, to reduce the degree delta, we first partition
the nodes into b nk c groups, where each group at least has k nodes. In this phase, our
aim is to make sure that the degree delta of each group is less than a target degree
p
delta, δtarget . We select δtarget = b n/ ln nc. When δmax,k is less than δtarget , in a
graph with n nodes, according to Theorem 4.4.2, n fake nodes are enough to generate
a k-anonymity graph in the next phase. The detailed steps of this phase is similar to
the deterministic anonymization scheme. We provide the detailed steps of this phase
in Appendix B.3 of the technical report.
4.4.3.1.2

Perturbing Node Degrees through Probabilistic Anonymization

Scheme In this phase, we randomly increase the node degrees by using the same
technique of the probabilistic anonymization method. We treat both the real nodes
and the fake nodes added by the last phase as the real nodes. Then, we can use the
probabilistic anonymization scheme to anonymize the graph.

4.4.3.2

Algorithm Analysis

Theorem 4.4.3. The hybrid anonymization scheme generates a k-anonymity graph.

94

p
Proof. When the degree delta of each group is reduced into b n/ ln nc, the minimal
p
k-node degree delta of each node is equal to or less than b n/ ln nc. According to
Theorem 4.4.2, we can prove this theorem.

4.5

Routing Policy Anonymization

In this section, we propose a local preference assignment scheme for fake edges. We
aim to guarantee that the real nodes and fake nodes have the similar local preferences,
so that fake nodes can not be identified by the local preferences. We consider both
outgoing preference and incoming preference. The outgoing preference of a node is
the average of local preferences that are assigned to its neighbors by this node. The
incoming preference of a node is the average of local preferences that are assigned
to this node by its neighbors. The proposed scheme generates local preferences so
that the distribution of the outgoing preferences and the incoming preferences for real
nodes are same with that for fake nodes.
The best paths are determined by the ranking of the local preferences instead
of the exact value of the local preferences. Thus, we use the ranking number of
these local preferences to represent the original values of these local preferences. For
example, if a node assigns local preferences to its four neighbors as 100, 200, 200 and
400, then the associated ranking numbers are 3, 2, 2 and 1 respectively.

4.5.1

Accommodating the Distribution of Outgoing Preference

To adjust the outgoing preferences of a node, we need to determine ranking number
for neighbors. Namely, how many neighbors have the ranking number 1, how many
neighbors have the ranking number 2 and so on. We refer to the set of neighbors
with the ranking number i as the i-th ranking set of the node. The union of all
ranking sets of a node should be the neighbor set of the node. Note, in this step, we
determine how many fake edges will be assigned with a ranking number instead of
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assigning the ranking number to specific fake edges. In the following, we illustrate
how we determine the size of the ranking sets for each node.
In each step, we randomly select a node and determine the size of the ranking sets.
For each node, we initiate the procedure from determining the size of first ranking
set and finish the procedure until the total size of ranking sets equals the number of
neighbors. To preserve the best path utility, a real node will not change the local
preference for its real neighbors and will not prefer fake neighbors over real neighbors.
Namely, the top ranking sets of a real node are already determined by the original
routing policy. For these real nodes, we select the size of ranking sets for their fake
neighboring relationships only.
To determine the size of i-th ranking set for a node, we investigate the size of i-th
ranking sets of the other nodes. If the size of i-th ranking sets of the other nodes are
all zero, then we just pick the size for i-th ranking set of this node. Therefore, the
total size of ranking sets of this node equals to the node degree. Otherwise, we select
an existing size for i-th ranking set of this node. More specifically, the probability of
selecting the size of i-th ranking set as s is as follows.

p(s, i) =




0


P

∀k, N (k, i) = 0
(4.2)
1/N (s,i)
(k|N (k,i)6=0) 1/N (k,i)

N (s, i) 6= 0.

where s is the size of a ranking set and N (s, i) is the number of i-th ranking sets with
the size s.

4.5.2

Accommodating the Distribution of Incoming Preference

Given the size of all ranking sets, we select specific neighbors for each ranking set.
The goal is to make the incoming preference of real nodes have the same distribution
with that of fake nodes. To preserve the best path utility, real nodes always prefer
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their real neighbors over fake neighbors. To avoid fake nodes having large incoming
preference, we make fake nodes prefer fake neighbors over real neighbors.
The maximal degree of real nodes, dmax , can be used by the adversary to remove
fake edges. For a node i, only if node j is one of its top dmax neighbors in the ascending
order of local preferences, then the edge (i, j) could be a real edge. Otherwise, the
edge (i, j) has to be a fake edge. To avoid an edge (i, j) from being identified as a
fake edge, node i and node j should treat each other as top dmax neighbors. To do so,
before assigning the local preference value to each fake edge, for each node, we select a
set of neighbors as its top dmax neighbors. We refer to those neighbors of the node as
high-ranking neighbors. Apparently, for a node, there are at most dmax high-ranking
neighbors. The rest neighbors are low-ranking neighbors. Only the edges between the
node and its low-ranking neighbors are identified as fake edges.
In Section 4.5.2.1, we first describe how a node classifies all neighbors as highranking neighbors and low-ranking neighbors, so that less fake edges are identified.
Then, in Section 4.5.2.2, we describe how to assign local preference based on the
neighbor classification.
4.5.2.1

Neighbor Classification

We start with real nodes to determine their high-ranking neighbors. To preserve
the best path utility, a real node has to select all its real neighbors as its high-ranking
neighbors. Then, we randomly select a specific number of fake neighbors as its highranking neighbors so that the number of high-ranking neighbors of a real node is
dmax . Next step, we process fake nodes one by one. For a fake node i, we select dmax
high-ranking neighbors in the following order.
1. The real neighbors of node i.
2. The fake neighbors that select node i as their high-ranking neighbors.
3. The fake neighbors that have not been processed.
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4. The fake neighbors that select node i as their low-ranking neighbors.
When dmax high-ranking neighbors are selected, the rest of neighbors will be lowranking neighbors of node i.

4.5.2.2

Assigning Local Preferences

For real nodes, we determine the local preference for fake neighbors only, since
all real neighbors already occupy the first few ranking sets. To satisfy the definition
of high-ranking neighbors, the high-ranking neighbors will be preferred over the lowranking neighbors. Therefore, to start with filling up the top ranking sets, we first
randomly select the high-ranking fake neighbors. Finally, we fill up the rest of the
ranking sets through randomly selecting low-ranking fake neighbors. For fake nodes,
we determine the local preference for both real and fake neighbors. We will first fill
up the top ranking sets by using the high-ranking fake neighbors. Then, the following
ranking sets are filled up by the high-ranking real neighbors. Finally, the low-ranking
neighbors are used to fill up the rest of the ranking sets in a random order.

4.6
4.6.1

Experiment
Datasets

To evaluate the proposed anonymization schemes, we anonymize a series of graphs
through these schemes. Since Internet topologies are power-law graphs, we synthesize
power-law graphs with various sizes for evaluation. In order to generate power-law
graphs that have the same properties with Internet topologies, we exploit the graph
generation algorithm in [25]. We also use the Internet AS-level topologies in CAIDA
AS Relationship Database [13] to evaluate the performance of these schemes on Internet topologies.
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Table 4.1: Number of fake nodes needed to anonymize Internet topologies.
Year
Number of Nodes
Maximal Degree
Average Degree
Hybrid n-anonymity
√
Hybrid n-anonymity
Hybrid ln n-anonymity
Deterministic n-anonymity
√
Deterministic n-anonymity
Deterministic ln n-anonymity
4.6.2

1998
3,638
770
3.7
10,682
5,094
4,944
3,621
750
675

2003
15,320
2,487
4.5
45,424
20,114
19,090
15,294
2,436
1,924

2008
28,411
2,874
5.6
84,095
33,835
32,655
28,357
2,765
2,174

2013
44,326
3,912
6.7
131,376
51,702
49,588
44,250
3,753
2,695

2018
60,874
7,296
9.9
181,224
74,784
71,174
60,792
7,030
5,224

The Size of Anonymized AS-level Topology

The time complexity of answering what-if questions increases as the size of the
graph grows [3, 12]. As a result, adding fake nodes enlarges the cost of using the
anonymized routing policies. In this experiment, we consider the number of fake
nodes added by the anonymization schemes.
We use Internet topologies to evaluate the number of fake nodes added by the
proposed anonymization schemes. We evaluate these schemes when k = n, k =
√
ln n and k = n. We illustrate the number of fake nodes needed to anonymize
Internet topologies of various sizes in Table 4.1. As Table 4.1 shows, the hybrid
and deterministic schemes need a moderate number of fake nodes to anonymize the
Internet topologies.

4.6.3

Potential Structure-based De-anonymization

All three anonymization schemes can change the structural feature of a node.
To quantify the perturbation, we investigate Closeness Centrality (CC) [28] which
measures how long it takes to spread information from a node to all the other nodes
sequentially and is defined as the reciprocal of the average shortest path distance to
the node over all the other nodes. More specifically, the closeness centrality of node
u is as follow.
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(a)
Determinisitic
anonymity.

(d)
Determinisitic
anonymity.

(g)
Determinisitic
anonymity.

n- (b)
Probabilistic
anonymity.

√

n- (e)
Probabilistic
anonymity.

ln n- (h)
Probabilistic
anonymity.

n-

√

(c) Hybrid n-anonymity.

n- (f) Hybrid

√

n-anonymity.

ln n- (i) Hybrid ln n-anonymity.

Figure 4.1: Distribution of Real Node Closeness Centrality.
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Table 4.2: Pearson correlation coefficient between Closeness Centrality in the original
graph and the anonymized graph.
k
n
√
n
ln n

Deterministic
0.95
0.97
0.99

Hybrid
0.55
0.47
0.52

Probabilistic
0.26
0.41
0.53

n−1
C(u) = Pn−1
,
v=1 d(v, u)

(4.3)

where d(v, u) is the shortest-path distance between node v and node u, and n is the
number of nodes that can reach node u.
We illustrate the distribution of closeness centrality of real nodes before and after
anonymization in Figure 4.1. In the experiment, we generate a power-law graph with
size 100 and anonymize the graph with deterministic, probabilistic and hybrid schemes
respectively. In those figures, each point represents the CC of a node before and after
anonymization, where the y-axis, “Original CC”, is the CC in the original graph and
the x-axis, “Anonymized CC”, is the CC in the anonymized graph. According to
the experimental results, both probabilistic and hybrid schemes change the original
closeness centrality of real nodes significantly. By contrast, as Figure 4.1a, Figure 4.1d
and Figure 4.1g show, the original CC and the anonymized CC of real nodes have a
linear relationship. The linear relationship become stronger when k is smaller. Since
we assume that the adversaries have the structure of the original graph, the strong
relationship between the original CC and the anonymized CC of a real node can be
potentially used for de-anonymization.
To quantify the relationship between the original CC and the anonymized CC,
we investigate Pearson correlation coefficient of them and illustrate the result in
Table 4.2. As shown in Table 4.2, the hybrid and probabilistic schemes significantly
reduce the correlation between the original CC and the anonymized CC.
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Table 4.3: Percentage of real nodes that are identified by seedless de-anonymization
algorithm [52].
Number of Nodes
Hybrid n-anonymity
√
Hybrid n-anonymity
Hybrid ln n-anonymity
Deterministic n-anonymity
√
Deterministic n-anonymity
Deterministic ln n-anonymity
4.6.4

100
0%
0.2%
1.2%
0%
2.4%
7.2%

400
0%
0.1%
0.15%
0%
1.05%
5.1%

700
0%
0.03%
0%
0%
0.94%
7.31%

1, 000
0%
0%
0.1%
0.02%
0.92%
7.28%

Robustness against De-anonymization Algorithm

There are a number of de-anonymiztion algorithms which exploit structural information to identify nodes from the anonymized graph. Most of them are seed-based.
Those algorithms rely on a seed graph which already maps a subset of real nodes in
the original graph to the nodes in the anonymized graph. However, in the context
of de-anonymizing network graph, it is hard to get a set of seed nodes. Therefore,
in the experiment, we consider the seedless de-anonymization algorithm to identify
the real nodes in the anonymized graph. We exploit the state-of-the-art seedless
de-anonymization algorithm [52] to identify the nodes from the anonymized graphs.
Table 4.3 illustrates the number of real nodes identified through de-anonymization
algorithm. In this experiment, we synthesize power-law graphs of various size and
perform the anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms. For each size, we generate five graphs and illustrate the average number of real nodes that are correctly
identified in Table 4.3. Although the anonymization schemes aim to perturb the degree of each nodes, to some extent, they can defend the de-anonymization algorithm
√
using structural information. When k is n, n or ln n, more than 90% real nodes can
not be correctly identified.
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(a) Outgoing Preference (DAS).

(b) Incoming Preference (DAS).

(c) Outgoing Preference (HAS).

(d) Incoming Preference (HAS).

Figure 4.2: Distribution of local preferences with Deterministic Anonymization
Scheme (DAS) and Hybrid Anonymization Scheme (HAS).
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(a) Outgoing Preference.

(b) Incoming Preference.

Figure 4.3: Distribution of local preferences with Hybrid Anonymization Scheme after
fake node removal.

4.6.5

Potential De-anonymization Using Local Preference

The local preference of nodes in the anonymized graph might be used to separate
real and fake nodes. In this experiment, we investigate the distribution of outgoing
and incoming preferences of real nodes and fake nodes. When the distribution for
real nodes are similar with that for fake nodes, the local preference is hard to be used
to identify real nodes.
We illustrate CDF of outgoing and incoming after deterministic and hybrid anonymization schemes in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 respectively. As Figure 4.2 shows, the
distributions for real and fake nodes are very similar. The adversary might or might
not use the local preference and the maximal degree to identify fake edges. Namely,
for each AS, only the dmax top-ranking links can be real links while the other links
have to be fake. These fake edges can be removed. Thus, in the experiments, we
consider the scenarios where the adversary uses or does not use fake edge removal.
As Figure 4.3 shows, the distributions for real and fake nodes are still very similar
after removing fake edges.
Fake edges in the anonymized graph can be removed through observing the outgoing local preference of each node. Even after removing fake edges, the seedless
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de-anonymization attack can not identify real nodes from the anonymized graphs.
The result is similar to Table 4.3. Due to the space limit, we do not list the result.

4.7
4.7.1

Related Work
Internet-Wide Network Verification

A number of formal methods have been exploited to verify properties for interdomain routing. To study the safety property of BGP systems, Satisfiable Module
Theories (SMT) [93] and Rewriting Logic [92, 94, 95] are used to verify the convergence conditions. A model checking tool is used to search possible attraction attacks
on the Internet [85]. A policy-aware model [79] is proposed for routing verification
at Internet scale. Those verification schemes need both the Internet topologies and
the routing policies of networks for the verification. To preserve the confidentiality
of routing policies, the proposed anonymization schemes can generate anonymized
graphs for those verification schemes.

4.7.2

Graph Anonymization

A series of graph anonymization mechanisms have been proposed at the area of
online social networks [61, 108, 109, 15, 76, 74, 23, 97, 101]. One large class of
anonymization mechanisms exploits k-anonymity, where k nodes in the anonymized
graph can not be separated from each other. The first approach in this direction is
proposed in [61], where each node shares the same degrees with at least k − 1 other
nodes. At the same time, Zhou and Pei [108] propose the concept of k-neighborhood
anonymity to defend against neighborhood attacks. To defend against more sophisticated structural attacks, k-automorphism [109] and k-isomorphism [15] are proposed.
Our schemes follow k-anonymity as well as preserve the best path utility for routing
verification.
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Another class of anonymization mechanisms use the Differential Privacy technique
to provide strong privacy guarantee [76, 74, 23, 97, 101]. Those mechanisms generate a
synthetic graph which maintains structural similarity to the original graph. However,
the best paths of the synthetic graph will be different from that of the original graph,
since there is not an injective function mapping from nodes of the original graph to
nodes of the synthetic graph.
To preserve edge privacy, Mittal et al. proposed a Random Walk based anonymization technique [69]. Although the preserving edge privacy can avoid local preferences
from being revealed, the best paths in the anonymized graph are changed and the
graph utility can not be preserved.

4.7.3

Secure Multi-Party Computation

Recently, to preserve policy privacy for networks, Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) methods are proposed for policy-compliant routes computation [7], [14]
and [47]. SMPC methods maybe applicable to part of verification problems which focus on the property of the best routes derived from a specific routing policy. Namely,
the best routes are derived by SMPC methods and then verified against network
properties. However, it is costly to verify the routes derived from a range of routing policies, since the routes need to be derived for each routing policy. It will be
infeasible, when the verification is for numerous routing policies. In contrast, the
proposed anonymization methods allow the routing verification tools to be applied
to the anonymized graph directly. The overhead is the additional cost to perform
routing verification on an enlarged graph.

4.8

Conclusion

In this chapter, we anonymize the inter-domain routing policies. We design the
anonymization schemes to guarantee the policy privacy of networks without jeopar-
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dizing the best path utility of the routing policies. To perturb the Internet topology,
we propose deterministic, probabilistic and hybrid anonymization schemes. These
three schemes guarantee that degree-based de-anonymization can not be identified
network from the anonymized graph with a probability higher than k1 . Even if the
de-anonymization attack using structural information can not identify more than 1%
of networks. After topology anonymization, we anonymize the routing policies accordingly. To do so, we propose a local preference assignment scheme. The resulting
local preferences in the anonymized graph preserve the best path utility and can not
be used to identify networks.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

This dissertation explores mechanisms to understand the behavior of the interdomain routing system derived from the routing policies of networks in the Internet.
First, we explore the safeness problem of BGP routing system. We propose policyrich routing through local coordination among ASs. More specifically, we systematically broaden routing policies to allow ASs to enable these potential routes and take
advantage of all routes with great flexibility. First of all, we propose FlexibleRC
policies to provide more flexibility for ranking peer routes. In addition, we propose
PeerBoost routing policies to enable selective export for providers and peers. Finally,
we propose hierarchical sibling polices to accommodate sibling relationships. We
derive convergence conditions for all above policies and propose the cycle-checking
scheme to show that the local coordination among neighboring ASs and siblings is
sufficient to guarantee the safeness of the routing system.
Second, we turn to network verification at Internet scale. We propose the general
biNode model to verify the policy-based routing through characterizing the verification problem into a SMT problem. Through analyzing the intrinsic hierarchy of
the routing policy, we can reflect the hierarchy in the constraints to accelerate the
SMT solving process. Further, we prune the general biNode model through removing
irrelevant variables. We implement the network verification toolkits which include
the general biNode model and the topology-based model, and evaluate these models.
The experimental results show that the general biNode model can reduce the time
it takes to perform verification by as much as 100x even under a modest topology
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size. It takes only a few minutes to answer a query for a topology containing tens of
thousands of nodes.
Lastly, we focus on the privacy of network routing policies. We anonymize the
Internet topology with the routing policies of networks for Internet-wide routing verification. We design the anonymization schemes to guarantee the policy privacy of
networks without jeopardizing graph utility for routing verification. To perturb the
Internet topology, we propose deterministic, probabilistic and hybrid anonymization
schemes. These three schemes guarantee that degree-based de-anonymization can not
be identified network from the anonymized graph with a probability higher than k1 .
Even if the de-anonymization attack using structural information can not identify
more than 1% networks. To perturb the routing policies, we propose a local preference assignment scheme. The resulting local preferences in the anonymized graph
preserve the graph utility and can not be used to identify networks.
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APPENDIX A
THEOREM PROOF FOR POLICY-RICH ROUTING

We exploit the algebraic theory [83, 81] to prove the convergence conditions for
policy-rich routing in Chapter 2. When the algebra of a routing system is free, the
routing system is guaranteed to converge. In the following proofs, we first model the
routing policies through the routing algebra and then prove that the routing policies
are guaranteed to converge.

A.1

Convergence of FlexibleRC Policy

For the FlexibleRC routing policy, we have L = {c, o, r, p},

P

= (L×P + )∪{, φ},

and W = {0, 1, 2, +∞}. Links joining providers to customers are called customer
links, and have label c; links joining customer to providers are called provider links,
and have label p. Links joining two ASs with peer-peer relationships are called peer
links. If a peer link joins an AS to its OC peer, the peer link is an OC peer link, and
has label o. Otherwise, the peer link is an under-customer peer link, and has label
r. The five signatures, , c, o, r, p for permitted paths represent five classes of paths:
trivial path (comprised of a single node); customer paths (in which the first link is a
provider-customer link); OC peer paths (in which the first link is an OC peer link);
under-customer peer paths (in which the first link is an under-customer peer link)
and provider paths (in which the first link is a customer-provider link). P + is the set
of all possible AS paths.
Each AS modifies the AS path of a route before announcement. Therefore, ⊕ of
various ASs are different. We use ⊕X to denote the ⊕ of the AS, X. The ⊕X operation
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is given in the next chart, where the first operand, a label, appears in the first column
and the second operand, a signature, appears in the first row.
Table A.1: The ⊕X operator for FlexibleRC routing policy.
⊕X
c
o
r
p


(c, X • P )
(o, X • P )
(r, X • P )
(p, X • P )

(o, P )
φ
φ
φ
(p, X • P )

(c, P )
(c, X • P )
(o, X • P )
(r, X • P )
(p, X • P )

(r, P )
(p, P )
φ
φ
φ
φ
φ
φ
(p, X • P ) (p, X • P )

For example, (o, P ) ⊕X o = φ means that an OC peer route will not be exported
through an OC peer link, since only customer routes are announced to peers. In
Table A.1, X • P indicates appending X into the origin AS path, P .
According to the import policy of FlexibleRC, the function f satisfies the following
rule.
f ((c, Pc )) ≺ f ((p, Pp ))

(A.1)

Namely, a customer route is preferred over a provider route.
According to the freeness property, we use Formula (A.2) to represent that a cycle,
u0 u1 ...un , is not free.

∀u0 , u1 ...un , ∃α0 , α1 ...αn ,
(α0 = αn ) ∧ (α0 6= φ) ∧ ...(αn 6= φ)∧
H(α0 , u0 ) ∧ ...H(αn , un ) ∧ α0 = αn ∧

f L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1  f (αn ) ∧ ...

f L(u1 , u0 ) ⊕ α0  f (α1 )

(A.2)

The predicate symbol H(α, n) indicates that the first node of the route, α, is n.
To prove the convergence condition, we first prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. In the FlexibleRC policy, if a cycle is not an OC cycle, then it is free.
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Proof. To prove the Lemma, we just need to prove that if a cycle is not free, it is an
OC cycle.
We first use logic formulas to represent the rules of FlexibleRC policy as follows.
Rule 1: No route is preferred over trivial paths.

∀α, α =  ∧ H(α, u) ∧ f (L(u, u0 ) ⊕ α0 )  f (α)
=⇒ L(u, u0 ) ⊕ α0 =  =⇒ ⊥

(A.3)

Rule 2: Customer or OC paths can be preferred over customer routes.

∀α, (α = c ∨ α = o) ∧ H(α, u) ∧ f (L(u, u0 ) ⊕ α0 )  f (α)

=⇒ L(u, u0 ) = c ∨ L(u, u0 ) = o ∧ α0 = c

(A.4)

Rule 3: Under-peer and provider paths can be only preferred over under-peer and
provider paths.

∀α, (α = r ∨ α = p) ∧ H(α, u0 ) ∧ f (L(u, u0 ) ⊕ α)  f (α0 )
=⇒ L(u, u0 ) = p ∧ (α0 = r ∨ α0 = p)

(A.5)

Then, we will use the aforementioned rules to show that given a cycle, u0 u1 ...un ,
is not free in FlexibleRC policy, the cycle is an OC cycle. We will first use Rule 1 to
show that the routes on the cycle can not be a trivial path. Therefore, a route is a
provider route, an under-peer route, an over-peer route or a customer route. Then,
we consider the types of each route from αn to α1 . If αn is a customer route or an
OC route, we use Rule 2 to show that αn−1 should be a customer route. If we apply
Rule 2 (n − 1) times on αn−1 ...α1 sequentially, we can show that all routes on the
cycle are customer routes or OC routes. Similarly, we can apply Rule 3 for the case

112

that αn is an under-peer route or a provider route. Applying Rule 3 n times, we can
show that all routes are under-peer routes or provider routes. Finally, for both cases,
the cycle is an OC cycle.

F omula (A.2) =⇒ ∃α0 , α1 ...αn , (α0 = αn ) ∧ (α0 6= φ)

∧ ...(αn 6= φ) ∧ f L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1  f (αn ) ∧ ...

f L(u1 , u0 ) ⊕ α0  f (α1 ) ∧ H(α0 , u0 ) ∧ ...H(αn , un )∧

αn = c ∨ αn = o ∨ αn = r ∨ αn = p
(Applying Rule 1, where substituting α for αn .)
=⇒ ∃α0 , α1 ...αn , (α0 = αn ) ∧ (α0 6= φ)

∧ ...(αn 6= φ) ∧ f L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1  f (αn ) ∧ ...

f L(u1 , u0 ) ⊕ α0  f (α1 ) ∧ H(α0 , u0 ) ∧ ...H(αn , un )∧


(αn = c ∨ αn = o) ∧ (L(un , un−1 ) = c ∨ L(un , un−1 ) = o
 
∧ αn−1 = c ∨ (αn = r ∨ αn = p)

∧ L(un , un−1 ) ∧ (αn−1 = r ∨ αn−1 = p)
(Applying Rule 2 and Rule 3 for αn , where
replacing α with αn and α0 with αn−1 )
=⇒ ∀i, 1 ≤ i ∧ i ≤ n∧



αi = c ∧ L(ui , ui−1 ) = c ∨ L(ui , ui−1 ) = o
!


∨ (αi = r ∨ αi = p) ∧ L(ui , ui−1 ) = p

(Applying Rule 2 and Rule 3 on αn−1 ...α1 sequentially.)
=⇒ OC(u0 u1 ...un ) (OC cycle definition)
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(A.6)

Theorem 2.4.1. A FlexibleRC routing policy is guaranteed to be safe, if there are no
OC cycles.
Proof. If there are no OC cycles, according to Lemma 1, all cycles are free. Then,
the routing system is guaranteed to converge.

A.2

Convergence of PeerBoost Policy

For PeerBoost policy, we have L = {(ux , uy ), (uy , ux )|ux and uy are connected
P
} and
= ({c, p, pdpr, dpr, upr} × R0+ ) ∪ {, φ}, where pdpr indicates a preferred
downward peer route, dpr indicates a downward peer route that is not preferred,
upr indicates an upward peer route and R0+ is the range for the backup level of a
route. According to the first import rule of PeerBoost, f () ≺ f (T1 , N1 ) ≺ f (T2 , N2 ),
where T1 , T2 ∈ {c, p, pdpr, dpr, upr}, N1 andN2 ∈ R0+ and N1 < N2 . According to
the second import rule of PeerBoost, f (T1 , N1 ) ≺ f (T2 , N1 ), if T1 ∈ {c, pdpr} and
T2 ∈ {p, dpr, upr}.
Lemma 2. In the algebra for PeerBoost policy, if there is no GD cycles or GU cycles,
all cycles are free.
Proof. To prove the Lemma, we just need to prove that if a cycle is not free, it is a
GD cycle or a GU cycle. To do so, we first show that all αi in Formula (A.2) have the
same backup level. Then, we show that each link in the cycle satisfies the definition
of GD or GU cycle. To do that, we separate the proof into two steps. In the first
step, we want to show that if a cycle in PeerBoost policy is not free, then all routes
in the cycle have the same backup level. In the second step, we use the definition of
GD and GU cycles, to show that the aforementioned cycle is a GD or GU cycle.
A.2.1

Equal Backup Level

We first use logic formulas to represent the rules of PeerBoost policy as follows.
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Rule 4: An AS prefers routes with lower backup level. This Rule is derived from
the first import policy rule of PeerBoost.

∀αi−1 , αi , f (αi−1 )  f (αi ) =⇒ B(αi−1 ) ≤ B(αi )

(A.7)

The function symbol B(α) indicates the backup level of the route, α.
Rule 5: Backup level monotonically increases during route announcement. According to the export policy of PeerBoost, the backup level of a route increases or
keeps unchanged when the route is announced to another AS.

∀αi , ui+1 , ui , H(αi , ui ) =⇒ B(αi ) ≤ B(L(ui+1 , ui ) ⊕ αi )

(A.8)

Then, we use those rules for the first step of the proof. We will first use Rule 4 to
derive the relationship of the backup level of routes on the cycle. A preferred route
has a smaller or equal backup level. Then, we use Rule 5 to show that on a cycle all
routes have the same backup level.
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F ormula (A.2) =⇒ B L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1 ≤ B(αn )

∧ ...f L(u1 , u0 ) ⊕ α0  f (α1 ) ∧ H(α0 , u0 ) ∧ ...H(αn , un )
(Applying Rule 4 for i=n)

=⇒ B L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1 ≤ B(αn )

∧ ...B L(u1 , u0 ) ⊕ α0 ≤ B(α1 ) ∧ H(α0 , u0 ) ∧ ...H(αn , un )
(Applying Rule 4 n-1 times)
=⇒ B(αn−1 ) ≤ B L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1

∧ ...B(α0 ) ≤ B L(u1 , u0 )) ⊕ α0

∧ B L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1 ≤ B(αn )

∧ ...B L(u1 , u0 ) ⊕ α0 ≤ B(α1 )



(Applying Rule 5 n times for i as 1...n)
=⇒ B(α0 ) = B(α1 ) = ... = B(αn )


= B L(u1 , u0 ) ⊕ α0 = ... = L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1

A.2.2

(A.9)

GD or GU Cycles

Rule 6: exporting customer route and preferred downward peer routes to providers
or peers without increasing backup level. According to PeerBoost policies, only a
customer route or a preferred downward peer route can be exported to a peer or a
provider without increasing backup level. Therefore, we have the following formula.


∀B L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 = B(αi−1 )∧
(L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 ) = c ∨ (L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 ) = dpr
=⇒ αi−1 = c ∨ αi−1 = pdp
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(A.10)

L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 = dpr is a predicate that the route L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 is a downward
peer route. αi−1 = pdp is a predicate that the route αi−1 is a preferred downward
peer route.
Rule 7: only routes from DP peers or customers are preferred over a customer route
or a preferred downward peer route. According to the import policy of PeerBoost,
a customer route can be preferred over customer routes or preferred downward peer
routes. Alternatively, according to the definition of DP peer, a route from a DP peer
can be preferred over customer routes or preferred downward peer routes. Then, we
have the following formula.


∀αi , (αi = c ∨ αi = pdp) ∧ f L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1  f (αi )

=⇒ L(ui , ui−1 ) = DP ∧ L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 = dpr

∨ L(ui , ui−1 ) = c ∧ L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 = c

(A.11)

Rule 8:


∀αi , B L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 = B(αi−1 )




∧ L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 = upr ∨ L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 = p

∧ B L(ui+1 , ui ) ⊕ αi = B(αi )




∧ L(ui+1 , ui ) ⊕ αi = upr ∨ L(ui+1 , ui ) ⊕ αi−1 = p

∧ f L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1  f (αi )
=⇒ αi = upr ∨ αi = p

(A.12)

Rule 9:
117

L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 = upr ∨ L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 = p



∧ (αi−1 = upr ∨ αi−1 = p)
∧ B(αi−1 ) = B(L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 )
=⇒ L(ui , ui−1 ) = U P ∨ L(ui , ui−1 ) = p

(A.13)

In PeerBoost polices, there are only four types of routes: customer routes, downward peer routes, upward peer routes and provider routes. We consider two scenarios
of the cycles.
• Scenario 1: one of the routes on the cycle, L(ui+1 , ui ) ⊕ αi , is a customer route
or a downward peer route.
• Scenario 2: one of the routes on the cycle, L(ui+1 , ui ) ⊕ αi , is an upward peer
route or a provider route.
For Scenario 1, we will show that if the cycle is not free, the cycle is a GU cycle. For
Scenario 2, we will show that if the cycle is not free, the cycle is a GD cycle.
If one of the routes on the non-free cycle, saying L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1 , is a customer
route or a downward peer route, then the cycle is a GD cycle.
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F ormula (A.9) ∧ (L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1 = c)

∨ (L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1 = dpr)
=⇒ F ormula (A.9) ∧ (αn−1 = c ∨ αn−1 = pdp)
(Applying Rule 6 for i = n)
=⇒ F ormula (A.9) ∧
∧ L(un−1 , un−2 ) ⊕ αi−2

L(un−1 , un−2 ) = DP

= dpr

∨ L(un−1 , un−2 ) = c ∧ L(un−1 , un−2 ) ⊕ αi−2 = c



(Applying Rule 7 for i = n-1)
=⇒ ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ L(ui , ui−1 ) = DP ∨ L(ui , ui−1 ) = c



(Alternatively applying Rule 6 and Rule 7 n-1 times)
=⇒ GD(u0 u1 ...un )
(Definition of GD cycle)

(A.14)

During the above derivation, we know that if one route on the cycle is a customer
route or a downward peer route, then ∀i, L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 is a downward peer route
or a customer route. Thus, routes of cycles for the rest cases are upward peer routes
or provider routes. Therefore, we can redefine Scenario 2 as all routes on the cycle
are upward peer routes or provider routes. In the following, we consider Scenario 2.
Namely, all routes on the cycles upward peer routes or provider routes.
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F ormula (A.9) ∧ (L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1 = upr)

∨ (L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1 = p)
=⇒ F ormula A.9 ∧ ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ (αi = c ∨ αi = pdp)
(Applying Rule 8 for n times)
=⇒ ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ L(ui , ui−1 ) = U P ∨ L(ui , ui−1 ) = p



(Applying Rule 9 for n times)
=⇒ GU (u0 u1 ...un )
(Definition of GU cycle)

(A.15)

Then we prove this lemma.
Theorem 2.5.1. A PeerBoost routing policy is safe, if there are neither GD cycles
nor GU cycles.
Proof. If there are neither GD cycles nor GU cycles, according to Lemma 2, all cycles
are free. Then, the routing system is guaranteed to converge.

A.3

Convergence of Sibling Policies

We derive the algebra for hierarchical sibling policy and show that if the convergence conditions hold, hierarchical sibling policy converges. We have L = {(ux , uy ), (uy , ux )|ux
P
and uy are connected. } and
= ({I, c, p, pdpr, dpr, upr} × {E, P S, BS} × R0+ ×
R0+ ×A+ ×P + )∪{}, where I indicates an internal route, E indicates a route received
from a neighbor which is not a sibling, P S indicates a route received from a preferred
sibling, and BS indicates a route received from a backup sibling. The first number
in the signature is the backup level of the route while the second number is the SBL
of the route.
We define a few additional symbols for hierarchical sibling policy. The predicate
symbol IN (α) indicates that α is an internal route. The predicate symbols, E(α),
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P S(α) and BS(α) indicate that α is received from a non-sibling neighbor, a preferred
sibling and a backup sibling respectively. The predicate symbol P L(u, v) and BL(u, v)
indicates that v is a preferred sibling of u and v is a backup sibling of u respectively.
The function symbol SB(α) indicates the SBL of the route, α.
Lemma 3. In the algebra for hierarchical sibling policy, if there is no PS cycles, GD
cycles and GU cycles, all cycles are free.
Proof. To prove the Lemma, we just need to prove that if there is no PS cycles, a
cycle that is not free is a GD cycle or a GU cycle. To do that, we consider two possible
cases: αi is an internal route or αi is not an internal route.
A.3.1

When a route is an internal route

Considering the hierarchical sibling policy, Rule 4 is satisfied. We also have the
following additional formulas.
Internal routes are preferred over all the other routes. When an internal route is
exported into a sibling, the SBL monotonically increases.
Rule 10: SBL monotonicity of internal routes


∀α, α0 , IN (α) ∧ H(α, u) ∧ f L(u, u0 ) ⊕ α0  f (α)

=⇒ IN (α0 ) ∧ SB(α0 ) < SB(α) ∨ SB(α0 ) = SB(α)

(A.16)

Rule 11:


∀α, α0 , SB(α) = SB(α0 ) ∧ f L(u, u0 ) ⊕ α0  f (α)∧
IN (α) ∧ IN (α0 ) ∧ H(α, u) ∧ H(α0 , u0 ) ∧ P S(α)
=⇒ P L(u, u0 ) ∧ BL(u0 , u) ∧ P S(α0 )
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(A.17)

Rule 12:


∀α, α0 , SB(α) = SB(α0 ) ∧ f L(u, u0 ) ⊕ α0  f (α)∧
IN (α) ∧ IN (α0 ) ∧ H(α, u) ∧ H(α0 , u0 ) ∧ BS(α0 )
=⇒ BL(u, u0 ) ∧ P L(u0 , u) ∧ BS(α)

(A.18)

Given any non-free cycle, u0 u1 ...un , we first assume that αn is an internal route.
For simplicity of expression, we define Cycle(u0 u1 ...un ) as a predicate symbol indicating that u0 u1 ...un is a cycle and F ree(u0 u1 ...un ) as a predicate symbol indicating
that the cycle, u0 u1 ...un , is free. Specifically, we first show that if, in a non-free cycle,
one of route, αn , is an internal route, then αn is a preferred sibling route or a backup
sibling route. Then, we use Rule 10 to show that all routes in the cycle have the same
sibling backup level. After that, we can use Rule 11 and Rule 12 to show that the
cycle is a PS cycle.
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∀u0 , ...un , ¬F ree(u0 u1 ...un ) ∧ Cycle(u0 u1 ...un ) ∧ IN (αn )
=⇒ ∃α0 , α1 ...αn , (α0 = αn ) ∧ (α0 6= φ) ∧ ...(αn 6= φ)∧

f L(un , un−1 ) ⊕ αn−1  f (αn ) ∧ ...

f L(u1 , u0 ) ⊕ α0  f (α1 ) ∧ H(α0 , u0 ) ∧ ...H(αn , un )∧

IN (αn ) ∧ P S(αn ) ∨ BS(αn ) (Applying Rule 4)
=⇒ ∀i, 1 ≤ i ∧ i ≤ n ∧ SB(αi−1 ) = SB(αi )∧

SB(αi ) = SB L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1 ∧ SB(αi ) = SB(αi−1 )∧

f L(ui , ui−1 ) ⊕ αi−1  f (αi ) ∧ (P S(αi ) ∨ BS(αi ))
(Applying Rule 10 n times)

P L(un , un−1 ) ∧ ...P L(u1 , u0 ) ∨

P L(u0 , u1 ) ∧ P L(ui−n , un )
=⇒

(Applying Rule 11 and 12 n times)
=⇒ P SC(u0 u1 ...un ) (Definition of PS cycle)

A.3.2

(A.19)

When a route is not an internal route

Clearly, if one route on a cycle is not an internal route, no route on the cycle is
an internal routes. To rank a route, the external segment has the priority. The proof
for PeerBoost policies can be applied to the sibling policies, since at sibling cluster
level the policy is same with PeerBoost.
Therefore, we show that is a cycle is not free, the cycle is PS, GD or GU cycles.

Theorem 2.6.1. A hierarchical sibling policy is guaranteed to be safe, if there are no
PS, GD or GU cycles.
Proof. If there are no PS cycles, GD cycles or GU cycles, according to Lemma 3, all
cycles are free. Then, the routing system is guaranteed to converge.
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APPENDIX B
THEOREM PROOF FOR GRAPH ANONYMIZATION

B.1

Determining Target Degrees in Deterministic Anonymization Schemes

In the deterministic anonymization scheme, we need to determine the target degree of each group and the number of fake nodes needed. In the following, we first
describe how to select the target degrees. Then, we will show that the deterministic
anonymization scheme generates k-anonymity graph.
We denote ditarget as the target degree of the group i. When fake nodes and real
nodes have the same target degrees, in the anonymized graph, fake nodes can not be
identified through node degrees. Therefore, we select the target degree of the fake
nodes as the target degree of one of the real node groups. When we select the target
degree of group x as the target degree of fake nodes, the target degree of fake nodes
is dxtarget . In this case, we denote the number of fake nodes added into the graph as
mx .
To generate k-anonymity graph, the target degree and the number of fake nodes
have to satisfy a series of constraints as follows.

B.1.1

The number of fake nodes are adequate

To guarantee that all real nodes can reach their target degrees, the number of
fake nodes should be large enough. Since we does not consider multiple edges and
self-loops in the graph, the number of fake nodes should be larger than the maximal
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degree gap of real nodes. We denote dimax and dimin as the maximal degree and
minimal degree in the group i. Namely,
mx ≥ max{gi |i ∈ V }

(B.1)

In addition, the total degree gap of real nodes should not be more than the total
degree gap of fake nodes.
X

mx ∗ dxtarget ≥

gi

(B.2)

i∈{RealN odes}

B.1.2

All nodes are able to reach their target degrees

In the anonymization procedure, we add fake edges but not remove real edges.
Therefore, the target degree of a node can not be less than the original degree of the
node. Then, the target degree of each group should not be less than the max degree
in the group.
ditarget ≥ dimax

(B.3)

When all nodes reach their target degrees, the total degrees in the anonymized graph
P
should be even. Namely, |E| ∗ 2 + i∈{RealN odes} gi + mx ∗ dxtarget is even. That is, we
P
need to select mx or dxtarget to make mx ∗ dxtarget − i∈{RealN odes} gi be even.
Given these constraints, we can minimize mx , when x ∈ [1, b nk c]. To minimize the
anonymization cost, we can pick the number of fake node as m = min(mx ).
Theorem 4.4.1. The deterministic anonymization scheme can generate a k-anonymity
graph.
Proof. During each phase of the graph construction in Section 4.4.1, all constraints
hold. Therefore, this theorem is proved.

B.2

Proof for Probabilistic Anonymization Scheme

In this section, we will prove Theorem 4.4.2.
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B.2.1

Model of Probabilistic Anonymization Scheme

Assume there are n nodes in the original graph, with the index from 1 to n. The
degree of ith real node is di . We add m fake nodes into the graph. The m fake nodes
have the index from n + 1 to n + m. Namely, the degree of ith fake node is dn+i = 0.
In the anonymization scheme, node ID are removed and each node is assigned a new
ID. Without loss of generality, we assume that the new IDs are still in the range
[1, n + m].
We define a random variable Ri as a degree noise for node i which is the fake edges
that are added in the anonymization scheme. The degree of ith node is increased from
di to Zi = di + Ri , where Zi is the degree of a node after anonymization. We define
all degrees in the original graph as a vector D = [d1 , d2 , ..., dn+m ].
We model the anonymization as a random permutation π on the set of n + m
nodes. Each node, i, is assigned the pseudonym π(i) in the anonymized graph. Y is
the anonymized version of Z. That is Yπ(i) = Zi and Yi = Zπ−1 (i) . Thus,

Y = [Zπ−1 (1) , Zπ−1 (2) , ..., Zπ−1 (n+m) ] = [Y1 , Y2 , ..., Yn+m ]

B.2.2

(B.4)

Preliminary

We first show that when the number of real nodes, n, goes to infinity, ∀i ∈ V ,
the probability that the degree noise, Ri , is around mp goes to 1. Thus, in the
anonymized graph, the degrees of all nodes are in a narrow range. As a result, it is
hard to identify a real node through the anonymized degree.
The degree noise of real nodes is around mp.
Lemma 4. For i ∈ [1, n],

2

P (|Ri − mp| ≤ ) ≥ 1 − 2e− 3mp
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(B.5)

Proof. Since Ri follows Binomial distribution, the Lemma can be proved through
applying Chernoff Bound.
The degree noise of fake nodes is also around mp + dmax .
Lemma 5. For i ∈ [n + 1, n + m], ζ > 0 and η > 0,

ζ2

η2

P (|Ri − mp − dmax | ≤ ζ + η) ≥ 1 − 2e− 3np − 2e− 3((m−n)p+dmax )

(B.6)

Proof. Ri is the sum of two random variables following Binomial distribution. Namely,
Ri = Ri,r +Ri,f . The first random variable, Ri,r , is the number of fake edges connecting
with real nodes while the second random variable, Ri,f , is the number of fake edges
connecting with fake nodes. Then, by applying union bound and Chernoff bound, we
have the following derivation.

P (|Ri − mp − dmax | ≤ ζi + ηi ) ≥ P (|Ri,r − np| ≤ ζi ∩ |Ri,f − (m − n)p − dmax | ≤ ηi )
= 1 − P (|Ri,r − np| ≥ ζi ∪ |Ri,f − (m − n)p − dmax | ≥ ηi )
≥ 1 − P (|Ri,r − np| ≥ ζi ) − P (|Ri,f − (m − n)p − dmax | ≥ ηi ) (Union bound)
ζi2

ηi2

≥ 1 − 2e− 3np − 2e− 3((m−n)p+dmax ) (Chernoff bound)
(B.7)

With high probability, the probabilistic scheme generates an anonymized graph,
√
in which the degrees of all nodes are in the range, [mp+dmin −(1+α) 3mp ln n, mp+
√
dmax + (1 + α) 3mp ln n], where α > 0.
Lemma 6. Given any α > 0,
√
√
lim P (∩n+m
i=1 (mp + dmin − (1 + α) 3mp ln n) ≤ Yi ≤ mp + dmax + (1 + α) 3mp ln n) = 1

n→∞

(B.8)
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Proof. We first consider a narrow range in terms of each Yi . For real nodes, we
√
√
consider the range as [mp − (1 + α) 3mp ln n + dmin , mp + (1 + α) 3mp ln n +
√
dmax ]. For fake nodes, we consider the range as [mp + dmax − (1 + α)( 3np ln n +
p
p
√
((m − n)p + dmax ) ln n), mp+dmax +(1+α)( 3np ln n+ ((m − n)p + dmax ) ln n)].
Then, we use Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 to prove this Lemma.
√
√
For simplicity of expression, we define ˆ = (1+α) 3mp ln n, ζ̂ = (1+α) 3np ln m
p
and η̂ = (1 + α) 3((m − n)p + dmax ) ln m. The derivation is as follows.
√
√
P (∩n+m
i=1 (mp − (1 + α) 3mp ln n) ≤ Yi ≤ mp + dmax + (1 + α) 3mp ln n)
n+m
≥ P (∩ni=1 (|Ri − mp| ≤ ˆ) ∩j=n+1
(|Rj − mp − dmax | ≤ ζ̂ + η̂))
n+m
(|Rj − mp − dmax | ≥ ζ̂ + η̂))
= 1 − P (∪ni=1 (|Ri − mp| ≥ ˆ) ∪j=n+1
n
n+m
P
P
≥1−
P (|Ri − mp| ≥ ˆ) −
P (|Rj − mp − dmax | ≥ ζ̂ + η̂) (Union bound)
i=1

j=n+1

ˆ2
− 3mp

≥ 1 − 2ne

− 2me

ζ̂ 2
− 3np

η̂ 2

− 2me− 3(m−n)p+3dmax ≥ 1 −

2
nα

−

2
mα

−

2
mα

(B.9)
Since, m ≥ n, the lemma is proved.
In the anonymized graph generated by the probabilistic scheme generates, there
is a bipartite graph where all real nodes in one side and all fake nodes in the other
side. Whether an edge exists in the bipartite graph is determined by a Bernoulli trial
with probability p. Given the degree sequence of real nodes, S = (s1 , ..., sn ), and the
degree sequence of fake nodes, T = (t1 , ..., tm ), in the bipartite graph, we can derive
the probability that the probabilistic scheme generates the bipartite graph as follows
Lemma 7. If

Pn

i=1

si =

Pm

j=1 tj

= K and pqmn → ∞, then

n
Q
√
P (S = S, T = T ) = (2 + O((pqmn)−1 ))p2K q 2mn−2K πpqmn
i=1

m
Q

m
si

j=1

n
tj


(B.10)

Proof. This Lemma is proved in Lemma 4 of [68].
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Lemma 8. Given π̃ ∈ {π|π(u) = o} and π̂ ∈ {π|π(u) = v}, where u ∈ {1, ..., n}\{v}.
If w = π̂ −1 (o) ≤ n and dif (π̂, π̃) = 2, then
lim P (π̂∩Y=y)
n→∞ P (π̃∩Y=y)

=1

(B.11)

Proof. Given a permutation π, we refer to the vector of real node degree after
anonymization as s(y, π). Specifically, si = yπ(i) − di for i ∈ [1, n]. Accordingly,
we refer to the vector of fake node degree after anonymization as r(y, π), where
ri = yπ(i+n) for i ∈ [1, m].
Each edge of a fake node can be classified into one of two groups: edges connecting
to fake nodes and edges connecting to real nodes. Then, for each fake node, we
define real neighbor degree as the number of edges connecting to real nodes while fake
neighbor degree as the number of edges connecting to fake nodes. Then, r(y, π) can
be the sum of two vectors, u(y, π) and t(y, π), where u(y, π) refers to the vector of
fake neighbor degrees of all fake nodes and t(y, π) refers to the vector of real neighbor
degrees of all fake nodes.
P
P
We use K = s(y, π) = t(y, π) to represent the number of fake edges between
real nodes and fake nodes.

P (Y=y|π̂)P (π̂)
P (Y=y|π̃)P (π̃)

=

P
P (s(y,π̂),t(y,π̂)|π̂)∗P (u(y,π̂)|π̂)
Pt+u=y
t+u=y P (s(y,π̃),t(y,π̃)|π̃)∗P (u(y,π̃)|π̃)

(B.12)

P (s(y, π̂), t(y, π̂)|π̂) is the probability to generate a bipartite graph with one set containing real nodes and the other set containing fake nodes, where s(y, π) represents
the fake degree sequence of the real nodes given the permutation π and t(y, π) represents the real degree sequence of the fake nodes given the permutation π. P (u(y, π̂)|π̂)
is the probability to generate a graph with fake nodes only, where u(y, π) represents
the fake degree sequence of the fake nodes given the permutation π
Since the difference of π̂ and π̃ is two and the switch is between two real nodes,
we have t(y, π̂) = t(y, π̃). Accordingly, the number of items in the denominator
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and the numerator of Equation B.12 are same. If the ratio of a pair of items in the
denominator and the numerator uniformly converges, then we can prove the limit of
Equation B.12 is one with n → ∞. For simplicity of expression, we define a function
F (t) to represent that ratio as follows. Then, we use Lemma 7 to calculate F (t). For
a real degree sequence of fake nodes, t(π̂), where 0 ≤ ti ≤ n and ui + ti = yπ̂−1 (i+n) .

F (t(π̂), t(π̃)) =

P (s(y,π̂),t(y,π̂)|π̂)∗P (u(y,π̂)|π̂)
P (s(y,π̃),t(y,π̃)|π̃)∗P (u(y,π̃)|π̃)

=

m
o −du
m
yo −dw

m
)∗(yv −d
)
w
)
)∗(yv m
−du

(2+O((pqmn)−1 ))(y
(2+O((pqmn)−1 ))(

(B.13)

Note, ∀t(π), F (t(π̂), t(π̃)) is in the same order and it is not a function of t(π). That
is, for any t(π), if F (t(π̂), t(π̃)) converge, then F (t(π̂), t(π̃)) converges uniformly.

lim F (t(π̂), t(π̃)) = lim

n→∞

Qyo −du −1

=

i=yv −du (m−i)

n→∞
Qyv +1

m
m
m
∗ y −d
yo −du
o −du
v
w
m
m
m
∗ y −d
n→∞ yo −dw
y −dw
v
u
Qoyv −d
Q
−1
d
−1
w
u
i=yv −du (m−i)
j=dw (yo −j)
Qyo −d
Qdu −1
w −1 (m−i)
i=yo −du
j=dw (yv −j)

(2+O((pqmn)−1 ))(y
(2+O((pqmn)−1 ))

(j−dw )
o
lim Qyo −dw −1 (m−i) Qj=y
yv +1
n→∞ i=yv −dw
j=yo (j−du )

)(
)(

(

= lim

n→∞

)
(
= lim
)
(

m
)∗(yv −d
)
w
)∗(yv m
−du )

(B.14)
Then, we can get the upper and the lower bound of the limit of F (t(π̂), t(π̃)).

(m−yv +du )(yo −dw )
v +dw +1)(yo −du +1) du −dw
)
≤ lim F (t(π̂), t(π̃)) ≤ lim ( (m−y
)du −dw
lim ( (m−y
(m−yo +du )(yv −dw )
o +dw +1)(yv −du +1)
n→∞

n→∞

n→∞

(B.15)
Then, we can get the following bounds.
v −du +dw +1
lim (du −dw ) yo −y
m−y +d

en→∞

o

u

u +dw +1
lim (du −dw ) yo −yvy−d
−d

∗ en→∞

o

u

(B.16)

≤ lim F (t(π̂), t(π̃))

n→∞
v +du −dw −1
lim (du −dw ) yo −y
m−y +d +1

≤ en→∞

o

w

u −dw −1
lim (du −dw ) yo −yyv +d
−d +1

∗ en→∞

v

u

Note, du −dw = O(δ(max,k) ), since node u and node w should be in the same group.
√
According to Lemma 6, we know that yo − yv = O(dmax − dmin + mp ln n). Since
2
m ≥ δ(max,k)
ln n, Equation B.11 is true. This Lemma is proved.
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B.2.3

Proof of the Theorem

Theorem 4.4.2. The probabilistic scheme generates a k-anonymity graph.
Proof. We define Π(u, v) = {π|π(u) = v} as a set of permutations which map node u
in the original graph to node v in the anonymized graph.

P

P (π(u) = v|Y = y) =

π̂∈Π(u,v)

Pn+m P
r=1

P (π̂∩Y=y)

π̃∈Π(u,r)

P (π̃∩Y=y)

(B.17)

The size of Π(u, v) is |Π(u, v)| = (n + m − 1)!. For any π ∈ Π(u, v), there are
(m + n − 1) permutations, each of them, π 0 ∈ Π(u, o), where o ∈ {1, . . . , n + m}\{v},
π 0 (π −1 (o)) = v and dif f (π, π 0 ) = 2. Then, for each π ∈ Π(u, v), we define that
(m + n − 1) permutations as a one-swap set of π. According to the one-swap set, we
can rewrite Equation B.17 as the following.

P

P (π(u) = v|Y = y) =

π̂∈Π(u,v)

Pn+m P
r=1

P (π̂∩Y=y)

π̃∈Π(u,r)

P (π̃∩Y=y)

P

=

P

P (π̂∩Y=y)
0
π 0 ∈S(π̂)∪π P (π ∩Y=y)

π̂∈Π(u,v)

π̂∈Π(u,v)

P

(B.18)
In addition, n − 1 permutations in S(π) has the property: π 0−1 (v) ≤ n, namely
the two different mapping of π and π 0 happen between two real nodes, u and π 0−1 (v).
According to Lemma 8, we know that the ratio is one if m and n go to infinity and
√
2
the swap happens between two real nodes that the degree delta, ∆d = o( dmax + n 5 ).
Note, for each node, there is a minimal k-node group that contains k nodes with the
degree delta smaller than ∆d . When the swap is between a real node and a fake node,
P

the ratio is positive. Therefore, lim

n→∞

P (π 0 ∩Y=y)
P (π̂∩Y=y)

π 0 ∈S(π̂)∪π

≥ k. Finally, this theorem is

proved.

B.3

The First Phase of Hybrid Anonymization Scheme in
Detail

The first phase contains four steps as follows.
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Figure B.1: Target Degree after Anonymization.

B.3.1

Determining Interim Target Degrees

For a real node, i, we define an interim target degree denoted as diint . After the
first phase, each real node will reach their interim target degree. For a node i in
p
group j, if di is less than djmax − b n/ ln nc, then it has the interim target degree, diint
p
as djmax − b n/ ln nc. Otherwise, the interim target degree of the node is the node
degree. Then, the degree gap of a node is the difference between its interim target
degree and its current degree. We use gi to denote the degree gap of node i.
Similarly, we select a real node group into which fake nodes are put and set an
interim target degree for the fake nodes. Assume that fake nodes are put into group
p
x, the interim target degree, dfint , is dxmax − b n/ ln nc. In contrast to real nodes,
after the first phase, the degree of each fake node is the interim target degree or one
more than the interim target degree. The reason is that after the first phase, we only
need to reduce the degree delta and we do not need all nodes in a group to have the
same degree.
Figure B.1 illustrates the target degrees after the first phase of hybrid anonymization scheme.
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B.3.2

Adding Fake Nodes

To anonymize the graph, we first add m1 fake nodes into the graph. m1 should
be large enough, so that it is possible to make every node reach their interim target
degrees. We will determine the exact number for m1 in the following construction.
We will use the similar idea of Section 4.4.1 to derive m1 . On one hand, m1 should
be large enough, so that fake nodes can help real nodes reach their interim target
degree. On the other hand, when real nodes reach their interim target degrees, m1
should be larger enough, so that fake nodes can reach their interim target degrees.

B.3.3

Connecting Real Nodes with Fake Nodes

Our aim is to make every real node reach their interim target degree. We first
separate real nodes and fake nodes into two sets. Then, we sort real nodes and fake
nodes in the descending order of their target degree gaps respectively. When two
nodes have the same target degree gap, any order works. We select the real node,
saying node i, that has the largest target degree gap and select gi fake nodes that
have the largest target degree gap. We repeat the process and make all real nodes
reach their interim target degree.
To guarantee that all real nodes can reach their interim target degree, there should
be enough fake nodes. We still consider the simple graph. Therefore, the number of
fake nodes should be larger than the maximal degree gap. Namely,

m1 ≥ max{gi |i ∈ V }

(B.19)

Gr
Gr
c or d m
e, where Gr is
After this procedure, the degree of fake nodes is either b m
1
1
P
the total gaps of the real nodes and Gr = i∈{RealN odes} gi .
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B.3.4

Connecting Fake Node with Fake Nodes

The goal of this step is to make fake node at least has the degree as dfint . If
Gr
Gr
e > dfint , the goal is satisfied and this step can be skipped. If d m
e > dxmax ,
dxmax ≥ d m
1
1

the degree of fake nodes already exceed the maximal degree of group x. Then, the
degree delta does not meet the requirement. If

dfint ≥ d

Gr
e,
m1

(B.20)

we connect fake nodes to increase their degrees.
We process one fake node at a time and increases it degree to its target degree.
We sort fake nodes in the descending order of their degree gaps. We select the fake
node, saying node i, that has the largest degree gap and gi other fake nodes that has
the largest degree gap. Then, node i is connected to those fake nodes. As a result,
node i will reach its interim target degree. We repeat the process until every fake
node reaches their interim target degrees or exceeds their interim target degree.
To guarantee that all fake nodes can reach their target degree,

m1 − 1 ≥

Gr
Gf − Gr
= dfint −
m1
m1

(B.21)
√

1+dfint −

dfint )2

(1+dfint )2 −4Gr

− 4Gr ≥ 0, m1 can be an integer in the range [1,
2
√
f
1+dint + (1+dfint )2 −4Gr
and [
, ∞]. Otherwise, m1 can be any positive integer.
2
If (1 +

]

We do not care about whether Gr and dfint are odd or even. When some fake nodes
have the degree as dfint + 1, the degree delta still satisfies the requirement. Similar
with the deterministic method, we still need to select x to minimize m1 .
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